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CORPORATE DISOBEDIENCE 
ELIZABETH POLLMAN† 
ABSTRACT 
  Corporate law has long taken a dim view of corporate lawbreaking. 
Corporations can be chartered only for lawful activity. Contemporary 
case law characterizes the intentional violation of law as a breach of the 
fiduciary duties of good faith and loyalty. While recognizing that rule 
breaking raises significant social and moral concerns, this Article 
demonstrates that corporate law and academic debate have overlooked 
important aspects of corporate disobedience. 
  This Article provides an overview of corporate disobedience and 
illuminates the role that it has played in entrepreneurship and legal 
change. Corporations violate laws in a variety of contexts, including as 
part of efforts at innovation, in battles of federalism, in taking stances 
against moralistic laws, in asserting claims for rights, and as part of 
general business lobbying to shape the law. To the extent that 
innovation or legal change can benefit society, some of this activity has 
the potential to provide social value. 
  This central insight and argument leads to additional contributions 
to corporate law and legal theory. First, examining the full spectrum of 
corporate disobedience reveals that corporate law’s requirement of 
lawful conduct embeds particular social values into the corporate code. 
It conveys the principle that corporations should pursue legal change 
through established and lawful democratic processes. Second, this 
examination shows that fiduciary duty law is ultimately not an effective 
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or fine-tuned mechanism for policing corporate disobedience. Third, 
the Article highlights several features of corporate disobedience that 
might bear on its normative assessment. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Introduction ............................................................................................ 710 
I.  The Single Lens Focus of Corporate Law and Literature on 
Violations of Law ........................................................................ 718 
A. Corporate Law’s Approach to Corporate  
 Lawbreaking ......................................................................... 719 
B. Scholarly Perspectives on Corporate Lawbreaking ......... 724 
II.  The Spectrum of Corporate Disobedience ................................... 728 
A. Violations Without Societal Benefit Beyond Corporate 
Profit: Wrongdoers, Criminals, and Derelicts ................... 729 
B. Disobedience with the Potential for Innovation  
 or Change: Innovators, Dissenters, Rebels, and 
Lobbyists ............................................................................... 731 
1. Innovation and Entrepreneurship ................................... 732 
2. Battles of Federalism ........................................................ 739 
3. Moral Stances and Claims for Rights ............................. 742 
4. General Business Lobbying ............................................. 747 
III.  Implications for Corporate Law and Beyond .............................. 748 
A. The Corporate Statute Is Expressive and Embeds  
 Society’s Interests ................................................................. 749 
B. Fiduciary Duties Are a Poor Fit for Constraining 
Corporate Disobedience ..................................................... 750 
C. Considerations for Evaluating Corporate  
 Disobedience ........................................................................ 757 
1. Proactive vs. reactive ........................................................ 757 
2. Open vs. secret .................................................................. 758 
3. For-profit vs. nonprofit .................................................... 761 
4. Public vs. private ............................................................... 762 
Conclusion ............................................................................................... 764 
 
INTRODUCTION 
No statistics measure the total number of corporations that 
disobey the law, but news headlines feature instances of corporate 
lawbreaking on a daily basis. Corporate fines stemming from claims of 
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legal violations have reached record levels.1 Corporate lawbreaking is 
the subject of widespread public disdain and frequent calls for action 
against corporations and the individuals acting on their behalf.2 
Corporate law scholars have largely shared this dim view of corporate 
disobedience.3 
Corporate law establishes as a fundamental tenet that 
corporations are chartered only to engage in lawful activity.4 
Historically, the ultra vires doctrine, requiring that a corporation act 
within the scope of powers set out in its charter, gave teeth to this 
prohibition on corporate illegal activity.5 Although the ultra vires 
doctrine has faded in importance over time, the corporate law 
requirement of lawful conduct has endured. Even economist Milton 
Friedman, known for his single-minded focus on shareholder wealth, 
famously made clear that corporate managers are to pursue profits 
within legal boundaries.6 In his words: “[T]here is one and only one 
social responsibility of business—to use its resources and engage in 
activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within the 
rules of the game.”7 
Corporate law’s dictates suggest a clear, binary, on–off, lawful or 
unlawful world that is implicitly reduced to a judgment of good or bad, 
inside or outside the rules of the game. Yet the world is full of 
corporate disobedience and lawbreaking that does not easily fit this 
mold. 
 
 1. Brandon L. Garrett, The Public Interest in Corporate Settlements, 58 B.C. L. REV. 1483, 
1485 (2017). 
 2. See, e.g., Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Corporate Crime Legislation: A Political Economy 
Analysis, 82 WASH. U. L. Q. 95, 96, 98 (2004) (describing the frequency of public outcries over 
corporate scandals and wrongdoing). 
 3. See infra Part I.B. 
 4. See infra Part I.A. 
 5. See Adam J. Sulkowski & Kent Greenfield, A Bridle, A Prod, and a Big Stick: An 
Evaluation of Class Actions, Shareholder Proposals, and the Ultra Vires Doctrine as Methods for 
Controlling Corporate Behavior, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 929, 946 (2005) (“It is important to clarify 
that illegal activities constituted one variety of ultra vires activity during the doctrine’s glory days 
in the 1800s and early 1900s and since then have never been rationalized as permissible as a matter 
of corporate law, even when profitable.”). 
 6. Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. 
TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 124 (quoting his book, MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND 
FREEDOM 133 (U. Chi. Press 1982) (1962)). 
 7. Id.; see also Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 733, 756–57 (2005) (“[M]ost advocates of a duty to profit-maximize concede it should 
have an exception for illegal conduct.”). 
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Consider, for example, Uber, the ride-hailing giant that has 
recently come under significant public scrutiny for a range of 
disobedient activity.8 It is currently the world’s most valuable startup 
company.9 From its early days, Uber aimed to challenge and change 
the law.10 Its app connects people who want rides with nearby drivers 
that are willing to provide this service, and Uber takes a percentage of 
each fare.11 Smartphone technology enabled a new model of taxi-like 
transportation,12 but in most cities the taxi industry was heavily 
regulated.13 This did not deter Uber. It launched operations in cities 
around the world—often in violation of existing laws or, at best, in legal 
gray areas.14 For example, when the company received a cease-and-
 
 8. In addition to legal issues related to its core ride-hailing business, Uber has recently faced 
a host of other concerns, including complaints of sexism and sexual harassment at the company, 
a trade secrets lawsuit by Alphabet’s self-driving vehicle company Waymo, and the U.S. 
Department of Justice’s criminal investigation into Uber’s use of a program called Greyball that 
enabled it to evade law enforcement authorities around the world. ADAM LASHINSKY, WILD 
RIDE: INSIDE UBER’S QUEST FOR WORLD DOMINATION 20 (2017) (“[Uber’s] maverick 
reputation quickly gave way to the perception of a company that considered itself above the 
law.”); Mike Isaac, Uber’s C.E.O. Plays With Fire, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/23/technology/travis-kalanick-pushes-uber-and-himself-to-the-
precipice.html [https://perma.cc/6NE4-ZRSB] (discussing Uber’s various scandals and issues). 
 9. Zack Friedman, These 197 Tech Companies Are the World’s Most Valuable Unicorns, 
FORBES (May 30, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/zackfriedman/2017/05/30/tech-
unicorns/#51a6edbd1179 [https://perma.cc/YAJ4-AVEM]; The Global Unicorn Club: Current 
Private Companies Valued at $1B+, CBINSIGHTS, https://www.cbinsights.com/research-unicorn-
companies [https://perma.cc/Q7NZ-TMZJ].  
 10. For an in-depth discussion of companies that “pursue a line of business that has a legal 
issue at its core,” and for an analytical framework of the business and legal factors that foster this 
activity, see Elizabeth Pollman & Jordan M. Barry, Regulatory Entrepreneurship, 90 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 383, 392 (2017).  
 11. Aswath Damodaran, A Disruptive Cab Ride to Riches: The Uber Payoff, FORBES (June 
10, 2014, 2:37 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/aswathdamodaran/2014/06/10/a-disruptive-cab-
rideto-riches-the-uber-payoff [https://perma.cc/W3QK-5E2C] (explaining the Uber business 
model); Richard Koch, How Uber Used a Simplified Business Model to Disrupt the Taxi Industry, 
ENTREPRENEUR (Jan. 3, 2017), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/286683 [https://perma.cc/
QP56-HWSP] (same).  
 12. See LASHINSKY, supra note 8, at 10 (“A mobile-first company, if there had been no 
iPhone there would have been no Uber.”). 
 13. See Paul Stephen Dempsey, Taxi Industry Regulation, Deregulation & Reregulation: The 
Paradox of Market Failure, 24 TRANSP. L.J. 73, 75 (1996) (“[N]early all large and medium-sized 
communities regulate their local taxicab companies.”); Katrina M. Wyman, Taxi Regulation in the 
Age of Uber, 20 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 4 (2017) (“For the first time in decades, 
medallion taxis now face competition from new upstarts not required to hold medallions, because 
the vehicles dispatched by Uber and other apps operate under a different, less stringent, 
regulatory framework.”). 
 14. See, e.g., LASHINSKY, supra note 8, at 4 (“Since it received its first cease-and-desist letter 
from the city of San Francisco in 2010, Uber has been clashing with adversaries from Seattle to 
New York and Paris to Delhi and beyond . . . .”); Pollman & Barry, supra note 10, at 398–400 
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desist letter early in its operations in San Francisco, it simply ignored 
the city’s demand.15 And in the years since, Uber and its competitors 
have grown quickly, leveraging consumer support to challenge 
restrictive taxi regulations and lobbies that had existed for decades.16 
The way that millions of people travel and commute has changed.17 An 
Uber investor referred to the company’s work as “a just cause” and 
“one of the grandest business and moral battles of our generation.”18 
Public reaction has reflected a mix of popular approval and vociferous 
backlash.19 
Consider another example, far afield from the technology startups 
of Silicon Valley. Companies that have taken advantage of state 
legalization of marijuana are operating in clear violation of current 
federal law.20 Although they are legal businesses in their home states, 
 
(discussing Uber’s playbook of launching operations despite legal violations and gray areas). 
 15. LASHINSKY, supra note 8, at 14, 90. 
 16. See Pollman & Barry, supra note 10, at 437–39 (discussing how regulatory entrepreneurs 
have the potential to ameliorate the political process “when there are asymmetries between how 
a policy’s costs and benefits are distributed,” such as protectionist regulations that provide rents 
to an industry and small dispersed costs to consumers). Notably, Uber has faced significant 
pushback to its operations in some jurisdictions. See, e.g., Amanda Erickson, Uber Was Just Dealt 
a Major Blow by the European Union, WASH. POST. (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.washington
post.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/12/20/uber-was-just-dealt-a-major-blow-by-the-european-
union/?utm_term=.52b28326206b [https://perma.cc/JF65-BKTV]; Prashant S. Rao & Mike Isaac, 
Uber Loses License to Operate in London, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/22/business/uber-london.html [https://perma.cc/7S3B-3BZA]. 
 17. In 2016, Uber claimed it had forty million monthly active riders. Aaron Yip, Has Uber’s 
Ridership Been Impacted By Its Scandals?, FORBES (Apr. 3, 2017, 1:23 PM) (citing Matthew 
Lynley, Travis Kalanick Says Uber Has 40 Million Monthly Active Riders, TECH CRUNCH (Oct. 
19, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/10/19/travis-kalanick-says-uber-has-40-million-monthly-
active-riders/ [https://perma.cc/9Z6M-ZWTZ]), https://www.forbes.com/sites/quora/2017/04/03/
has-ubers-ridership-been-impacted-by-its-various-scandals/#377d3aba2dee [https://perma.cc/ 
92E7-26LD]. 
 18. Alex Davies, Travis Kalanick’s Great Defender Writes a Hell of a Motivational Letter, 
WIRED (Aug. 30, 2017, 2:12 PM) (quoting venture capitalist Shervin Pishevar), 
https://www.wired.com/story/uber-shervin-pishevar-kalanick-letter [https://perma.cc/R5AP-
4HZP]. 
 19. For example, Philadelphia taxi companies sued Uber in 2014, asserting: “Not since the 
days of bootlegging has there been a criminal enterprise so brazen and open as to attract hundreds 
of millions of dollars in investment from investment bankers and to operate in blatant violation 
of federal and state law as the Uber enterprise.” Edvard Pettersson, Uber Called ‘Criminal 
Enterprise’ by Philadelphia Cab Owners, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 24, 2014, 6:31 PM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-12-25/uber-called-criminal-enterprise-by-
philadelphia-cab-owners-1- [https://perma.cc/EU6C-FJQB].  
 20. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Introduction: Marijuana Laws and Federalism, 58 B.C. L. 
REV. 857, 859 (2017) (“From the perspective of constitutional law, the inconsistency in marijuana 
laws between the federal government and many states, among the states, and between the states 
and Native American tribes raises serious and often unprecedented federalism issues.”); Uri 
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under the Controlled Substances Act it is illegal to distribute or 
dispense a controlled substance, which is defined to include 
marijuana.21 The conflict between state and federal marijuana laws 
means that companies are engaging in a form of disobedience by 
operating their business in this industry.22 Over the course of just a few 
years, the federal government has taken a variety of positions, from 
stating that it would not prioritize enforcement of federal law against 
medical marijuana users and businesses to threatening a federal 
crackdown.23 And in the meantime, the industry has grown to 
multibillion-dollar revenues.24 
While recognizing the significant social and moral concerns 
concomitant with rule breaking, this Article illuminates the important 
role that corporate disobedience has played in entrepreneurship and 
legal change. Although corporations pose special concerns, the central 
contribution of this Article echoes, in many ways, observations about 
the bottom-up dynamic of lawmaking and the role of lawbreaking that 
have been made in other scholarly literatures, such as constitutional 
law, property law, and democratic theory.25 Time and again, 
 
Berliner, As More States Legalize Marijuana, Investors and Marketers Line Up, NPR (Nov. 20, 
2016, 6:52 AM), http://www.npr.org/2016/11/20/502577270/investors-marketers-line-up-to-tap-
legal-marijuana-around-u-s [https://perma.cc/LQ9T-F9BR] (“While polls show that about 60 
percent of Americans now favor legalization of marijuana, cannabis remains illegal under federal 
law, a Schedule 1 drug like heroin or LSD under the Controlled Substances Act. . . . None of this 
seems to have discouraged the growing legion of marijuana entrepreneurs.”); John Hudak & 
Christine Stenglein, DEA Guidance Is Clear: Cannabidiol Is Illegal and Always Has Been, 
BROOKINGS: FIXGOV (Feb. 6, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2017/02/06/
cannabidiol-illegal-and-always-has-been/ [https://perma.cc/45DC-T5Y6]. 
 21. 21 U.S.C. § 812 Schedule I(C)(10) (2018). 
 22. This illegality gives rise to a host of related issues such as tax treatment and obtaining 
legal counsel. See Sam Kamin & Eli Wald, Marijuana Lawyers: Outlaws or Crusaders, 91 OR. L. 
REV. 869, 886–930 (2013) (discussing professional conduct issues for lawyers advising clients on 
marijuana-related businesses); Benjamin Moses Leff, Tax Planning for Marijuana Dealers, 99 
IOWA L. REV. 523, 526 (2014) (discussing tax issues for marijuana-related businesses); Luke 
Scheuer, The “Legal” Marijuana Industry’s Challenge for Business Entity Law, 6 WM. & MARY 
BUS. L. REV. 511, 514, 531–36 (2015) (discussing various issues that marijuana-related businesses 
face).  
 23. Scheuer, supra note 22, at 523–28; Charlie Savage & Jack Healy, Trump Administration 
Takes Step That Could Threaten Marijuana Legalization Movement, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/04/us/politics/marijuana-legalization-justice-department-
prosecutions.html [https://perma.cc/7Z9R-CWXW].  
 24. Chemerinsky, supra note 20, at 858 (“[T]he total American cannabis industry generated 
retail sales of $53 billion in 2015. Further, over the past two years, the fraction of marijuana sold 
through legal channels has grown from an estimated $3 billion to nearly $6 billion, as more states 
have voted to allow medical or recreational use.”). 
 25. See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM 
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 24–29 (2004) (describing the role of lawbreaking and resisting 
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corporations have intentionally taken actions that violated laws and 
have pushed for clarifications and reform.26 Many observers will take 
issue with certain examples or find aspects of corporate disobedience 
deserving of social opprobrium. A study of this activity nonetheless 
illustrates that corporate disobedience has been an important engine 
for transforming various areas of law. 
Yet, the role that corporate lawbreaking has played in innovation 
and legal change has been mostly ignored.27 Instead, the main focus of 
scholarly inquiry has been the socially harmful nature of corporate 
lawbreaking and how to efficiently or effectively constrain it.28 
Corporate law scholars have also examined directors’ and officers’ 
intentional violations of law in the context of the doctrine of good faith. 
This debate has largely focused on whether the fiduciary duty of good 
faith should be understood as an independent duty or as one cabined 
within the duty of care or loyalty,29 and the focal point of analysis has 
 
unconstitutional laws in early American culture); Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 
Term – Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 47–48 (1983) (exploring how 
minorities may break laws in protest as part of their own process of interpreting the Constitution 
and communicating dissent); Daniel Markovits, Democratic Disobedience, 114 YALE L.J. 1897, 
1933–48 (2005) (examining the role and justification for democratic disobedience); Eduardo 
Moisés Peñalver & Sonia K. Katyal, Property Outlaws, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1095, 1101–02 (2007) 
(arguing that lawbreaking has played an important role in the evolution of property entitlements); 
cf. Jessica Bulman-Pozen & David E. Pozen, Uncivil Obedience, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 809 
(2015) (highlighting the phenomenon of “extreme law-following” as a means of criticizing laws 
and motivating reform). 
 26. This activity may have social and political dimensions, but this Article does not suggest 
that business corporations should be understood as expressive associations. See Margaret M. Blair 
& Elizabeth Pollman, The Derivative Nature of Corporate Constitutional Rights, 56 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 1673, 1733–38 (2015) (discussing how many corporations cannot be characterized as 
identifiable groups of natural persons associated for expressive purposes); James D. Nelson, The 
Freedom of Business Association, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 461, 513 (2015) (arguing that “for-profit 
businesses should fall outside the scope of the freedom of association”). 
 27. One notable example to the contrary, examining “whether civil disobedience has any 
role to play in the business context,” is Daniel T. Ostas, Civil Disobedience in a Business Context: 
Examining the Social Obligation to Obey Inane Laws, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 291, 293 (2010).  
 28. This literature is voluminous, and includes, for example, BRENT FISSE & JOHN 
BRAITHWAITE, CORPORATIONS, CRIME, AND ACCOUNTABILITY (1993); Jennifer Arlen, The 
Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 833 (1994); Joseph 
F.C. DiMento, Gilbert Geis & Julia M. Gelfand, Corporate Criminal Liability: A Bibliography, 
28 W. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (2000–2001); Kent Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives! A Stakeholder Analysis 
of Corporate Illegality (With Notes on How Corporate Law Could Reinforce International Law 
Norms), 87 VA. L. REV. 1279 (2001); Assaf Hamdani & Alon Klement, Corporate Crime and 
Deterrence, 61 STAN. L. REV. 271 (2008). 
 29. Key works include Stephen M. Bainbridge, Star Lopez & Benjamin Oklan, The 
Convergence of Good Faith and Oversight, 55 UCLA L. REV. 559 (2008); Melvin A. Eisenberg, 
The Duty of Good Faith in Corporate Law, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (2006); Andrew S. Gold, The 
New Concept of Loyalty in Corporate Law, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 457 (2009); Sean J. Griffith, 
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been on failures of oversight rather than on intentional or knowing 
lawbreaking.30 To the extent that scholars have discussed the latter, it 
has been from a law and economics perspective of fines as a cost of 
business or as a critique of such a perspective.31 This debate ignores the 
dynamic potential of corporate lawbreaking to catalyze the 
reevaluation and evolution of laws outside of corporate law and the 
particular challenges and complexities that this activity poses. 
Examining corporate disobedience reveals that there is a wide 
array of lawbreaking, ranging from truly repugnant activity that has no 
redeeming social value to innovative entrepreneurship that arguably 
falls into a legal gray area or transgresses laws made in a different 
technological or social age. In addition, corporate lawbreaking includes 
activity ranging from garden-variety compliance failures to what some 
might refer to, quite provocatively, as corporate civil disobedience—
when a corporation takes a stance against a particular law, asserting 
that it impinges upon a right or a social or moral value held by 
individuals associated with the corporation. 
This Article aims to shed light on the broad spectrum of corporate 
disobedience to show the true complexity of this activity and to suggest 
that, to the extent that innovation or legal change can benefit society, 
some corporate disobedience could at least have the potential to 
provide value. This inquiry aims to take account of the world as it is, 
with the many varied instances in which corporations subvert, 
transgress, challenge, dissent from, and refuse to comply with the law—
all, broadly construed, forms of disobedience. Some of this corporate 
activity might be praiseworthy, while some might be contemptible. This 
Article does not aim to evaluate each instance of corporate 
disobedience, but rather to demonstrate its complexity and its power 
to advance entrepreneurial efforts and shape the law. 
This central insight and argument leads to several additional 
 
Good Faith Business Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric in Corporate Law Jurisprudence, 55 DUKE 
L.J. 1 (2005); Hillary A. Sale, Delaware’s Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 456, (2004); Leo E. 
Strine, Jr., Lawrence A. Hamermesh, R. Franklin Balotti & Jeffrey M. Gorris, Loyalty’s Core 
Demand: The Defining Role of Good Faith in Corporation Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 629 (2010); Robert 
B. Thompson, The Short, But Interesting Life of Good Faith as an Independent Liability Rule, 55 
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 543 (2010); Julian Velasco, How Many Fiduciary Duties Are There in 
Corporate Law?, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1231 (2010).  
 30. Corporate law scholarship on the duty of good faith and oversight includes Claire A. Hill 
& Brett H. McDonnell, Stone v. Ritter and the Expanding Duty of Loyalty, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1769 (2007); Andrew C.W. Lund, Opting Out of Good Faith, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 393 (2010); 
Hillary A. Sale, Monitoring Caremark’s Good Faith, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 719 (2007).  
 31. See infra Part I.B. 
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contributions in corporate law and legal theory. First, illuminating 
corporate disobedience reveals that the statutory requirement of 
lawful conduct serves an expressive function. These statutes can 
further be interpreted as embedding society’s interests into corporate 
codes and conveying the principle that corporations should pursue 
legal change through established and lawful democratic processes.32 
Furthermore, observing the full spectrum of corporate 
disobedience also sheds new light on corporate law and the literature 
regarding the fiduciary duty of good faith.33 Characterizing legal 
obedience as part of the duty of good faith and then debating whether 
that duty should exist independently or be cabined within the duty of 
loyalty has left a larger point unexplored. The requirement of lawful 
conduct is intended to protect society’s interests, not those of the 
corporation. Because shareholders are the only corporate constituents 
with the power to assert a breach of fiduciary duty through a derivative 
suit, fiduciary duty law is ultimately not an effective or fine-tuned 
mechanism for policing corporate disobedience. Shareholders typically 
own stock in corporations to make money, not to monitor, evaluate, 
and enforce legal obedience.34 Shareholders may not be well situated 
or motivated to carry out society’s interests with regard to corporate 
disobedience, particularly with respect to corporate conduct that is 
rooted in innovation, changing social norms, or dissent. This Article 
demonstrates that current law may even lead to inequitable results in 
some circumstances when violations of the law are interpreted as 
automatic breaches of fiduciary duty. 
Finally, this Article provides a conceptual framework, highlighting 
several features of corporate disobedience that might bear on its 
normative assessment.35 The question of when breaking the law is 
justifiable has long been the subject of legal philosophy about civil 
disobedience and conscientious objection, but scholars have not 
focused on corporations.36 Corporations are different from individuals 
 
 32. See infra Part III.A. 
 33. See infra Part III.B. 
 34. See Lynn A. Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos? Disagreement, Market, Failure, 
and Securities Regulation, 81 VA. L. REV. 611, 623 (1995) (“[M]ost investors trade to make 
money.”); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Securing Our Nation’s Economic Future: A Sensible, Nonpartisan 
Agenda to Increase Long-Term Investment and Job Creation in the United States, 71 BUS. LAW. 
1081, 1081 (2016) (noting that people invest to create wealth and savings, and that money 
managers seek returns). 
 35. See infra Part III.C. 
 36. Classic works discussing the topics of civil disobedience and conscientious objection 
include RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE (1985); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF 
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in important ways.37 Corporations cannot face the consequences of 
punishment in the same way as individuals, who can be imprisoned, 
and corporations are legal entities that do not have moral conscience 
equivalent to that of an individual. Corporations often represent 
significant economic power. Corporate disobedience therefore poses 
rich and novel questions that have real-world as well as theoretical 
importance. This Article identifies several considerations that may be 
relevant, including whether the corporation is proactively seeking 
clarification or change in the law or is instead reacting to enforcement, 
whether the corporation has openly or clandestinely violated the law, 
whether the corporation is for-profit or nonprofit, and whether the 
corporation is public or private. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I sets out the limited 
treatment and relatively narrow understanding of corporate 
lawbreaking embodied in corporate law and literature. Part II 
describes the wide variety of corporate disobedience, showing that 
although a great deal of this activity is socially harmful, some corporate 
disobedience has the potential to produce value or catalyze legal 
change. This type of activity raises complex, underexamined issues. 
Part III identifies and explores several implications of this 
contribution. 
I.  THE SINGLE LENS FOCUS OF CORPORATE LAW AND LITERATURE 
ON VIOLATIONS OF LAW 
What does corporate law have to say about corporations engaging 
in unlawful activity? This Part reviews the relevant corporate code and 
doctrine and then shows that the standard paradigm of corporate law 
supposes a binary world of lawful and unlawful activity, authorized and 
unauthorized actions, and perhaps an implicit judgment of societal 
good and bad. Further, this Part examines the scholarly literature on 
corporate lawbreaking, demonstrating that even academic debate has 
been narrowly focused. 
 
JUSTICE (2d ed. 1999); MICHAEL WALZER, OBLIGATIONS: ESSAYS ON DISOBEDIENCE, WAR, 
AND CITIZENSHIP (1970); Jürgen Habermas, Civil Disobedience: Litmus Test for the Democratic 
Constitutional State, 30 BERKELEY J. SOC. 95 (1985); Jeremy Waldron, A Right to Do Wrong, 92 
ETHICS 21 (1981); HENRY DAVID THOREAU, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE (Project Gutenberg Literary 
Archive Foundation 2006) (1849), https://www.gutenberg.org/files/71/71-h/71-h.htm 
[https://perma.cc/47XB-AJV6]. 
 37. See infra Part III.C. 
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A. Corporate Law’s Approach to Corporate Lawbreaking 
It is a fundamental principle of corporate law that corporations 
are to be engaged only in lawful activity. Put another way, corporate 
law is broadly enabling within the constraint that corporations act 
inside the bounds of the law.38 
This “essential bottom-line requirement” of lawful conduct can be 
understood in historical context and as a function of the basic fact that 
it is only through government-granted charters that corporations 
exist.39 Historically, corporations were chartered through legislative 
acts for specifically authorized activity.40 
The ultra vires doctrine, which limits a corporation’s authority to 
the purposes and powers enumerated in its charter, served as an 
important part of corporate law through the nineteenth century.41 The 
doctrine was understood to serve the state’s interest in limiting the size 
and power of corporations and to protect shareholders from 
managerial overreach that could undermine their investments.42 Over 
time, these rationales for the doctrine lost force, and only a vestige of 
the doctrine remains.43 
Most notably, with the spread of general incorporation statutes, 
each state provides individuals with the ability to charter a for-profit 
corporation without specification as to its activity, subject to the 
 
 38. See Strine, Jr. et al., supra note 29, at 633; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101(b) (2016). 
 39. Strine, Jr. et al., supra note 29, at 649. For a discussion of the concession theory of the 
corporation, see MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: 
THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 72–73 (1992); William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic 
Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1475, 1484 (1989); 
John Dewey, The Historical Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 655, 655–
68 (1926).  
 40. J.W. HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES 1780-1970 14–17 (1970); see also Gregory A. Mark, Comment, The 
Personification of the Business Corporation in American Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1441, 1452 
(1987) (“That a corporation derived its powers from the sovereign was inherent in the contractual 
conception of the grant theory. The government granted nothing unless it agreed to the objects 
of the proposed corporation.”). 
 41. Greenfield, supra note 28, at 1283–84, 1302. 
 42. Id. at 1302; Henry Hansmann & Mariana Pargendler, The Evolution of Shareholder 
Voting Rights: Separation of Ownership and Consumption, 123 YALE L.J. 948, 987–91 (2014). 
 43. Greenfield, supra note 28, at 1302; see also Herbert Hovenkamp, The Classical 
Corporation in American Legal Thought, 76 GEO. L.J. 1593, 1663–64 (1988); Alan R. Palmiter, 
Duty of Obedience: The Forgotten Duty, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 457, 460 (2011) (“[A]s corporate 
law (and judicial review of corporate actions) moved from questions of corporate power to those 
of fiduciary duty, the ultra vires doctrine became largely vestigial—and its appendage, the duty 
of obedience, quietly wilted away.”). 
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requirement that it be for lawful purpose.44 For example, section 101(b) 
of the Delaware General Corporation Law provides: “A corporation 
may be incorporated or organized under this chapter to conduct or 
promote any lawful business or purposes, except as may otherwise be 
provided by the Constitution or of the law of this State.”45 Many 
corporations broadly state their purpose in their articles or certificate 
of incorporation as to “engage in any lawful act or activity.”46 
This statutory requirement of lawful conduct is generally 
understood to reflect basic public policy concerns.47 The origins of the 
“lawful business” language in general incorporation statutes have, 
however, received scant attention from historians and legal scholars. 
Interpreting the original meaning of “lawful business” is not 
straightforward. For example, Connecticut’s 1837 act, one of the 
earliest general incorporation statutes, allowed for incorporation “for 
the purpose of engaging in and carrying on any kind of manufacturing 
or mechanical or mining or quarrying or any other lawful business.”48 
A plausible interpretation of this language is that its drafters intended 
to indicate a nonexclusive list of industries that could be pursued but 
not to authorize general incorporation for activities that were limited 
by other statutes, such as banking, which at the time continued to 
require a special act for chartering.49 
 
 44. For a discussion of the spread of general incorporation statutes in the nineteenth century, 
see Jessica L. Hennessey & John Joseph Wallis, Corporations and Organizations in the United 
States after 1840, in CORPORATIONS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 74, 78–85 (Naomi R. 
Lamoreaux & William J. Novak eds., 2017). For a discussion of the shift to allowing corporations 
to be chartered for any lawful purpose, see E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., Statutory Developments in 
Business Corporation Law, 1886–1936, 50 HARV. L. REV. 27, 29 (1936); Wiley Rutledge, 
Significant Trends in Modern Incorporation Statutes, 22 WASH. U. L.Q. 305, 317–18 (1933).  
 45. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101(b) (2016). 
 46. That is, for example, what the certificates of incorporation of Uber Technologies, Inc., 
Google, Inc., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., and many others provide. 
 47. See, e.g., Gold, supra note 29, at 475 (“Public policy is a leading basis for limiting the 
board’s discretion to break the law.”). 
 48. 1837 Connecticut General Incorporation Act, Laws, Ch 63; Revised Statutes (1854), Title 
III. (on file with author); see also Eric Hilt, Corporation Law and the Shift Toward Open Access 
in the Antebellum United States, in ORGANIZATIONS, CIVIL SOCIETY, AND THE ROOTS OF 
DEVELOPMENT 148, 154 (Naomi R. Lamoreaux & John Joseph Wallis eds., 2017) (“[I]n 1837, 
Connecticut passed a general incorporation act that was the first to not specifically enumerate the 
industries that could be pursued, or to limit the duration of the existence of the corporations it 
created.”). 
 49. In 1852, Connecticut enacted a general incorporation statute for banks. Connecticut 
Communities and Corporations, Chapt. XXIII, §§ 2–3 (1852). Some current general incorporation 
statutes have language referring to “any lawful act” in combination with language that carves out 
industries subject to other statutory requirements. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 202(b)(1)(A) 
(West 2015) (“The purpose of the corporation is to engage in any lawful act or activity . . . other 
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Although the statutory dictate of lawful activity could be 
interpreted as simply referring to the purposes for which a corporation 
could be chartered, courts have broadly interpreted it to include the 
ongoing manner in which business is conducted. The universe of 
corporate law cases about directors’ and officers’ knowing violation of 
the law consistently takes an unfavorable view of lawbreaking and 
denies business judgment rule protection, the normal standard of 
deference for directors’ decision-making.50 
In a leading early case, Roth v. Robertson,51 the court sustained 
recovery from the managing director of an amusement park 
corporation who used corporate funds to bribe individuals who had 
threatened to complain about the park violating the state’s Sunday 
closing laws.52 According to the court, corporate managers who make 
illegal payments must refund the amounts “wasted for the benefit of 
stockholders.”53 Even though there was no allegation or proof of 
personal profit by the director, and the corporation made a large 
percentage of its revenues from operating on Sundays, the court upheld 
a jury award against the director for $800, the amount of the bribes.54 
The court explained that holding otherwise would “be establishing a 
dangerous precedent, and tacitly countenancing the wasting of 
corporate funds for purposes of corrupting public morals.”55 
In a more contemporary case, Miller v. AT&T,56 shareholders of 
AT&T, a New York corporation, brought a derivative suit against the 
directors after the company failed to collect from the Democratic 
National Committee a $1.5 million debt owed for services provided to 
 
than the banking business, the trust company business or the practice of a profession permitted 
to be incorporated by the California Corporations Code . . . .”). 
 50. Patrick J. Ryan, Strange Bedfellows: Corporate Fiduciaries and the General Law 
Compliance Obligation in Section 2.01(A) of the American Law Institute’s Principles of Corporate 
Governance, 66 WASH. L. REV. 413, 448 (1991). See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, The 
Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83 (2004) (discussing 
conceptions of the business judgment rule as an abstention doctrine and as a deferential standard 
of review). 
 51. Roth v. Robertson, 118 N.Y.S. 351 (Sup. Ct. 1909). 
 52. Id. at 354. 
 53. Id. at 353. 
 54. Id. at 353–54. 
 55. Id. at 353. Another notable early case is Abrams v. Allen, 74 N.E.2d 305 (N.Y. 1947), in 
which a corporate board of directors approved dismantling plants for the purpose of unlawfully 
intimidating union organizing efforts. As in Roth, the Abrams court did not apply the business 
judgment rule and treated the allegations of illegality and loss as sufficient to state a claim for 
breach of fiduciary duty. Id. at 307. 
 56. Miller v. AT&T, 507 F.2d 759 (3d Cir. 1974). 
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the party’s political convention.57 The plaintiff-shareholders argued 
that the failure to collect the debt amounted to AT&T making a 
“contribution” to the political party in violation of a federal prohibition 
on corporate campaign spending, and the plaintiffs sought injunctive 
relief to force the corporation to properly collect the debt.58 The Third 
Circuit held that the shareholders had stated a claim for breach of 
fiduciary duty arising from the alleged violation of federal law.59 The 
court explained that the business judgment rule “cannot insulate the 
defendant directors from liability if they did in fact breach [a statutory 
prohibition], as plaintiffs have charged.”60 
Other cases and commentaries have likewise stated that corporate 
directors and officers who engage in unlawful conduct on behalf of the 
corporation violate their fiduciary duties. For example, the Delaware 
Chancery court has explained, “a fiduciary may not choose to manage 
an entity in an illegal fashion, even if the fiduciary believes that the 
illegal activity will result in profits for the entity.”61 In its statement of 
the duty of care, the American Law Institute’s Principles of Corporate 
Governance include the obligation that directors and officers act within 
the bounds of the law.62 Further, the business judgment rule protections 
do not apply when directors and officers knowingly participate in 
illegal conduct.63 Legal compliance is a first-order requirement; profit-
seeking follows in the hierarchy of the business corporation’s mission.64 
 
 57. Id. at 761. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 761–62. 
 60. Id. at 762. The court also discussed the net loss rule that requires the plaintiff to assert 
damage to the corporation in order to state a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty. Id. at 
762–63 n.5. Commentators have debated the questionable continued authority of the New York 
decisions setting out the net loss rule. See, e.g., 2 JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, 
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 10:7 (3d ed. 2017) (discussing the net loss rule); 
Norwood P. Beveridge, Does the Corporate Director Have a Duty Always to Obey the Law?, 45 
DEPAUL L. REV. 729, 732–33, 744 (1996) (same); Eisenberg, supra note 29, at 37 n.97 (same). 
 61. Metro Commc’n Corp. BVI v. Advanced Mobilecomm Techs. Inc., 854 A.2d 121, 131 
(Del. Ch. 2004); see also Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003) (“[O]ne cannot 
act loyally as a corporate director by causing the corporation to violate the positive laws it is 
obliged to obey.”).  
 62. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
§§ 2.01(b)(1), 4.01(a) (AM. LAW INST. 2008). The commentary recognizes limited exceptions to 
the general law-compliance obligation under the doctrines of necessity or desuetude. Id. § 2.01 
cmts. f–g (providing, for example, an exception where “[t]he ordinance has fallen into disuse: it 
has not been enforced for many years; many retail businesses . . . follow a practice of staying open 
on Sunday; and community opinion favors the practice”). 
 63. Id. § 4.01. 
 64. Strine, Jr. et al., supra note 29, at 651 (“Law compliance thus comes ahead of profit-
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While lawful conduct has long been understood as a fundamental 
tenet of corporate law, judicial opinions have only recently shed light 
on how exactly it fits into the fiduciary framework. Good faith had long 
been an “immutable ingredient”65 of corporate law, but it “remained 
essentially undefined” until about a decade ago.66 The groundbreaking 
case of In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation67 started to give 
content to the fiduciary duty of good faith: 
Cases have arisen where corporate directors have no conflicting self-
interest in a decision, yet engage in misconduct that is more culpable 
than simple inattention or failure to be informed of all facts material 
to the decision. To protect the interests of the corporation and its 
shareholders, fiduciary conduct of this kind, which does not involve 
disloyalty (as traditionally defined) but is qualitatively more culpable 
than gross negligence, should be proscribed. A vehicle is needed to 
address such violations doctrinally, and that doctrinal vehicle is the 
duty to act in good faith.68 
The court specifically pointed to a fiduciary’s intentional violation of 
law as an example of a failure to act in good faith.69 
Following the Disney case, the Delaware Supreme Court further 
clarified that the duty of good faith is part of the fiduciary duty of 
loyalty. In Stone v. Ritter,70 the court explained that the duty of good 
faith is not an independent fiduciary duty, but rather a “subsidiary 
element” of the duty of loyalty.71 Therefore, the implication of Disney 
 
seeking as a matter of the corporation’s mission, and directors owe a duty of loyalty to that 
hierarchy.”). 
 65. E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, What Happened in Delaware Corporate 
Law and Governance from 1992-2004? A Retrospective on Some Key Developments, 153 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1399, 1442 (2005). 
 66. Bainbridge et al., supra note 29, at 564. 
 67. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006). 
 68. Id. at 66. 
 69. The court stated: 
A failure to act in good faith may be shown, for instance, where the fiduciary 
intentionally acts with a purpose other than that of advancing the best interests of the 
corporation, where the fiduciary acts with the intent to violate applicable positive law, or 
where the fiduciary intentionally fails to act in the face of a known duty to act, 
demonstrating a conscious disregard for his duties. 
Id. at 67 (emphasis added). 
 70. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006). Stone is an oversight case involving “a classic 
Caremark claim.” Id. at 364 (explaining that a Caremark claim against a director for a corporate 
loss “is predicated upon ignorance of liability creating activities within the corporation” (quoting 
In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996))).  
 71. Id. at 364, 369–70 (“The failure to act in good faith may result in liability because the 
requirement to act in good faith ‘is a subsidiary element[,]’ i.e., a condition, ‘of the fundamental 
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and Stone is that when a fiduciary acts with conscious disregard of a 
known duty to act, or when a fiduciary intends to violate the law, that 
is a breach of the duty of good faith and hence a breach of the duty of 
loyalty. 
Subsequent case law has reiterated this logic about lawbreaking 
and disloyalty. For example, in Desimone v. Barrows,72 the Delaware 
Chancery Court explained: 
[B]y consciously causing the corporation to violate the law, a director 
would be disloyal to the corporation and could be forced to answer 
for the harm he has caused. Although directors have wide authority 
to take lawful action on behalf of the corporation, they have no 
authority knowingly to cause the corporation to become a rogue, 
exposing the corporation to penalties from criminal and civil 
regulators.73 
Indeed, the Delaware Supreme Court acknowledged in Stone that 
this characterization means that “the fiduciary duty of loyalty is not 
limited to cases involving a financial or other cognizable fiduciary 
conflict of interest.”74 As Professor Andrew Gold has observed: “A 
common theme is that this case law bars director choices that are, at 
least potentially, made with the intent of benefitting the corporation or 
its shareholders.”75 That is, “[t]hese cases preclude directors from 
dishonest conduct toward shareholders or from conduct that exceeds a 
director’s authority—regardless of whether or not the directors 
honestly believe their decisions will produce desirable outcomes.”76 
There need not be self-interested conduct for a breach of the duty of 
loyalty; under this interpretation, conduct beyond that authorized by 
the corporate charter, such as unlawful activity, is disloyal by its nature. 
Corporate law is binary in this regard—corporations are authorized 
only for lawful activity, and loyalty must operate within this category. 
B. Scholarly Perspectives on Corporate Lawbreaking 
The legal literature on corporate violations of law has not been as 
uniformly opposed to or clear in disaffirming unlawful activity, but it 
has been limited in focus. Two central questions have dominated the 
 
duty of loyalty.’” (quoting Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003))). 
 72. Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.3d 908 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
 73. Id. at 934. 
 74. Stone, 911 A.2d at 370. 
 75. Gold, supra note 29, at 473. 
 76. Id. 
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literature: Can corporations use a cost-benefit approach to 
lawbreaking? How do intentional violations of law fit into the 
framework of fiduciary duties? 
The key lightning rod on the first question emerged in the 1980s 
with Judge Frank Easterbrook and Professor Daniel Fischel’s work 
applying a law and economics lens. Easterbrook and Fischel 
provocatively argued: “Managers have no general obligation to avoid 
violating regulatory laws, when violations are profitable to the firm, 
because the sanctions set by the legislature and courts are a measure of 
how much firms should spend to achieve compliance.”77 
Setting aside laws concerning violence or acts characterized as 
malum in se, they argue that the penalty for breaking the law should 
be understood simply as the “price” of the illegal conduct—fines and 
other costs discounted by the probability that the legal violation will 
not be detected and enforced against the corporation.78 Furthermore, 
under their view, corporate law itself should not aim to constrain 
unlawful activity or external costs—that is the purview of external 
regulations and enforcement officials.79 
Easterbrook and Fischel go so far as to argue that corporations 
should break the law in some circumstances: 
[M]anagers do not have an ethical duty to obey economic regulatory 
laws just because the laws exist. They must determine the importance 
of these laws. The penalties Congress names for disobedience are a 
measure of how much it wants firms to sacrifice in order to adhere to 
the rules . . . managers not only may but also should violate the rules 
when it is profitable to do so.80 
 
 77. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Antitrust Suits by Targets of Tender Offers, 
80 MICH. L. REV. 1155, 1168 n.36 (1982). 
 78. Id.; Daniel R. Fischel & Alan O. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 319, 324 
(1996) (arguing that appropriate levels of deterrence will be achieved by setting the penalty for 
misconduct equal to the social cost of that misconduct, “adjusted for the chance of 
nondetection”). 
 79. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 38 (1991). As Easterbrook and Fischel explain:  
We do not address optimal ways to deal with pollution, bribery, plant closings, and 
other decisions that have effects on people who may not participate in the corporate 
contract. Society must choose whether to conscript the firm’s strength (its tendency to 
maximize wealth) by changing the prices it confronts or by changing its structure so 
that it is less apt to maximize wealth. The latter choice will yield less of both good ends 
than the former. 
Id.  
 80. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 77, at 1177 n.57; see also Daniel R. Fischel, The 
Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1290 (1982) (“[I]f the expected costs 
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Their work is part of a broader literature that takes an economic 
approach to civil and criminal liability, analyzing the optimal amount 
of deterrence, enforcement, and penalties.81 
A number of scholars have pushed back on this economic view 
with arguments rooted in moral and social concerns and with a goal of 
advancing the legitimacy of corporations in society. One of the most 
vocal critics of Easterbrook and Fischel’s “law-as-price theory” has 
been Professor Cynthia Williams, who identified the growing influence 
of that viewpoint by the late 1990s.82 She argues that law should not be 
seen as voluntary, but rather as the embodiment of morals that must 
be followed in a democracy.83 Her argument follows a long and 
distinguished line of philosophers who have examined the moral 
obligation to obey the law.84 Other scholars have similarly criticized the 
economic perspective for overlooking the normative value of law.85 In 
 
of fines are less than the costs of installing compliance programs, the proper course to maximize 
shareholders’ wealth is to do nothing and pay the fines.”). 
 81. See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, in ESSAYS IN 
THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT, 2–45 (Gary S. Becker & William M. Landes eds., 
1974) (proposing an economic theory of criminal behavior); Keith N. Hylton, Optimal Law 
Enforcement and Victim Precaution, 27 RAND J. ECON. 197, 197–205 (1996) (analyzing, inter alia, 
state enforcement costs and the costs of victim precaution to derive an optimal punishment policy 
for the deterrence of criminal activity); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Optimal 
Tradeoff between the Probability and Magnitude of Fines, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 880, 880–91 (1979) 
(asserting that the optimal enforcement policy for criminal liability must balance the level of 
sanctions required to achieve deterrence with the social costs that those sanctions impose).  
 82. Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Compliance With the Laws in the Era of Efficiency, 76 
N.C. L. REV. 1265, 1265 (1998).  
 83. Id. at 1385 (“Law, in a democracy, is more than a price tag. It is a command in which we 
participate, a limit on unacceptable behavior, and an architecture for social, political, and 
economic interaction.”); cf. Stephen L. Pepper, Counseling at the Limits of the Law: An Exercise 
in the Jurisprudence and Ethics of Lawyering, 104 YALE L.J. 1545, 1554 (1995) (“[T]he modern 
lawyer’s legal realist (and law-and-economics) view of the law may lead the client to respect the 
law less; to choose to violate the law and chance the consequences.”). Another sharp critic of the 
law and economics approach is Professor Kent Greenfield, who has advocated for reviving the 
ultra vires doctrine. See Greenfield, supra note 28; KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS AND PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES 75–88 (2006).  
 84. See e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER, THE FORCE OF LAW 55 (2015). 
 85. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation and Corporate Governance: An Essay on Steering 
Between Schylla and Charybdis, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 789, 794 n.11 (1984) (stating that 
Easterbrook and Fischel’s view “at least as applied to most regulatory laws, simply [misstates] the 
legislative intent, which was not to establish a tariff but to prohibit certain behavior”); Robert 
Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523, 1523 (1984) (“[T]he economic perspective 
is blind to the distinctly normative aspect of law, viewing a sanction for doing what is forbidden 
merely as the price of doing what is permitted.”); Robert W. Gordon, The Citizen Lawyer—A 
Brief Informal History of a Myth with Some Basis in Reality, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1169, 1201 
(2009) (“[T]he growth of economism as an academic mode of thinking about law devalues any 
conception of law as expressing norms or public purposes.”).  
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scholarly writings on corporate law, Chief Justice Leo Strine of the 
Delaware Supreme Court, together with distinguished co-authors, has 
echoed this point: 
American corporate law embeds law compliance within the very 
mission of the corporation. Loyalty to the corporation’s obligation as 
a citizen to attempt in good faith to abide by the law is not incidental 
to a director’s duties, it is fundamental. We find it dismaying that this 
point is even arguable.86 
The other major point of dispute in the literature concerning 
corporate lawbreaking has centered on how best to classify this 
conduct within the framework of fiduciary duties. In many ways, this is 
a continuation of the debate about taking a cost-benefit approach to 
corporate lawbreaking and a translation of that viewpoint into the 
language of fiduciary duties. 
The Delaware Supreme Court’s 2006 decisions in Disney and 
Stone sparked this inquiry by lodging intentional violations of law 
within the duty of good faith and as a subset of loyalty. Corporate law 
scholars Melvin Eisenberg and Stephen Bainbridge criticize this 
categorization as a poor fit; they argue that the duty of good faith 
should instead be its own independent duty because managers typically 
act for profit-maximizing purposes rather than out of self-interest.87 
Similarly, Professor Julian Velasco has noted that “[a]ny ‘disloyalty’ 
would be to the law and to society, which is not what the duty of loyalty 
is about.”88 
 
 86. Strine, Jr. et al., supra note 29, at 653 n.71; see also Palmiter, supra note 43, at 458 (arguing 
that explicit recognition of a duty of obedience “would advance the legitimacy of the corporation 
in society”).  
 87. Bainbridge et al., supra note 29, at 592 (“Individuals routinely make cost-benefit analyses 
before deciding to comply with some malum prohibitum law, such as when deciding to violate the 
speed limit. Is it self-evident that the directors of a corporation should be barred from engaging 
in similar cost-benefit analyses?”); Eisenberg, supra note 29, at 38 (arguing that knowingly 
causing the corporation to violate the law should be rooted in an independent duty of good faith, 
not in the duty of loyalty “because typically the manager does not engage in self-interested 
conduct” and not in the duty of care “because typically the manager rationally believes that the 
illegal conduct will serve the end of profit maximization”). 
 88. Velasco, supra note 29, at 1267 (noting additionally that “it is unfair to say that any 
violation of the law, however small and regardless of the circumstances, would amount to a breach 
of the duty of loyalty”). But see Strine, Jr. et al., supra note 29, at 653 (“To somehow contend that 
it is loyal to engage in consciously unlawful conduct because the directors believed in good faith 
that the conduct would be in the best interests of stockholders desiring profits but in bad faith 
toward society is, well, silly.”). 
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Notably, this legal literature envisions a static, narrow range of 
corporate lawbreaking. The examples discussed in these works tend to 
further the viewpoint of the respective authors. For instance, literature 
advocating a cost-benefit approach typically includes an example 
involving a quotidian, low-level offense such as a simple traffic 
violation, whereas scholarly work arguing against this approach might, 
by contrast, use the example of polluting a river.89 What is noteworthy, 
however, is not the difference between these examples, but rather what 
is missing: examples involving innovation, entrepreneurship, and 
efforts inside or outside of the political process to catalyze legal change. 
II.  THE SPECTRUM OF CORPORATE DISOBEDIENCE 
It is widely understood—indeed often decried—that corporations 
can use their power to change the law. Corporations can take positions 
against the law. And they can evade and innovate around the law. But 
despite burgeoning literatures on topics such as innovation and 
regulation,90 corporate lobbying and political speech,91 and corporate 
 
 89. See Bainbridge et al., supra note 29, at 592 (discussing routine cost-benefit approaches to 
compliance, such as deciding whether to abide by a speed limit); Strine, Jr. et al., supra note 29, 
at 652 n.71 (“The question in Lincoln’s case was whether literal compliance with some laws would 
endanger the endurance of the republic . . . . It was not whether to generate lucre at the cost of 
illegally polluting a river.”); Williams, supra note 82, at 1282 (discussing an example from the ALI 
Principles of a corporate decision-maker who knowingly engages in tactics against union workers 
that violate the National Labor Relations Act).  
 90. See generally, e.g., Eric Biber, Sarah E. Light, J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Regulating 
Business Innovation as Policy Disruption: From the Model T to Airbnb, 70 VAND. L. REV. 1561 
(2017) (examining how business innovation creates policy disruption and ways in which regulators 
should respond); Ryan Calo & Alex Rosenblat, The Taking Economy: Uber, Information, and 
Power, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1623 (2017) (critiquing the sharing economy and proposing updates 
to consumer protection law); Stephen R. Miller, First Principles For Regulating The Sharing 
Economy, 54 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 147 (2016) (proposing principles to guide regulatory responses 
to the sharing economy); Pollman & Barry, supra note 10, at 392 (examining “regulatory 
entrepreneurs,” defined as “companies [that] pursue a line of business that has a legal issue at its 
core”); Daniel E. Rauch & David Schleicher, Like Uber, But for Local Governmental Policy: The 
Future of Local Regulation of the “Sharing Economy,” 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 901 (2016) (advancing 
the use of agglomeration economics and public choice theory to form policy responses to the 
sharing economy); Matthew T. Wansley, Regulation of Emerging Risks, 69 VAND. L. REV. 401 
(2016) (arguing that regulators should use an experimentalist model to regulate risky emerging 
technologies); Tim Wu, Strategic Law Avoidance Using the Internet: A Short History, 90 S. CAL. 
L. REV. POSTSCRIPT 7 (2017) (discussing the importance of law enforcement in response to 
regulatory entrepreneurship).  
 91. See generally, e.g., LEE DRUTMAN, THE BUSINESS OF AMERICA IS LOBBYING: HOW 
CORPORATIONS BECAME POLITICIZED AND POLITICS BECAME MORE CORPORATE (2015) 
(exploring how lobbying has increased the political power of business in the United States); 
Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Shining Light on Corporate Political Spending, 101 
GEO. L.J. 923 (2013) (proposing corporate political spending disclosures); Jill E. Fisch, How Do 
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conscience,92 the frame of reference for disobedience in corporate law 
has been static. It does not capture the dynamic relationship between 
law, business, and regulation.93 This Article aims to enrich this account. 
A. Violations Without Societal Benefit Beyond Corporate Profit: 
Wrongdoers, Criminals, and Derelicts 
To start first with well-trodden ground, a substantial slice of 
unlawful conduct by corporations involves criminality or compliance 
failures that have little or no redeeming societal value. Some of this 
corporate misconduct reflects widespread and blatantly fraudulent or 
deceptive conduct carried out over time and with the intent to subvert 
detection. 
The Wells Fargo account scandal provides a recent example.94 
Misconduct at the bank was first uncovered by the Los Angeles Times, 
an investigation by city and federal regulators in Los Angeles followed, 
and in an eventual settlement, the company paid $185 million in fines.95 
The investigation brought to light years of fraudulent practices carried 
out by thousands of employees working in a culture of aggressive sales 
goals and quotas.96 The settlement with regulators did not end the 
impact of the scandal on the company, which sparked a firestorm of 
 
Corporations Play Politics?: The FedEx Story, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1495 (2005) (providing a case 
study of the political activity of FedEx); Richard L. Hasen, Lobbying, Rent-Seeking, and the 
Constitution, 64 STAN. L. REV. 191 (2012) (proposing a national economic welfare rationale for 
lobbying regulation). 
 92. For literature on “corporate conscience,” see THE RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS 
LIBERTY (Micah Schwartzman, Chad Flanders, & Zoë Robinson eds., 2016); Brett H. McDonnell, 
The Liberal Case for Hobby Lobby, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 777 (2015); Alan J. Meese & Nathan B. 
Oman, Hobby Lobby, Corporate Law, and the Theory of the Firm: Why For-Profit Corporations 
are RFRA Persons, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 273 (2014); James D. Nelson, Conscience, Incorporated, 
2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1565; Amy J. Sepinwall, Corporate Piety and Impropriety: Hobby Lobby’s 
Extension of RFRA Rights to the For-Profit Corporation, 5 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 173 (2015); 
Elizabeth Sepper, Taking Conscience Seriously, 98 VA. L. REV. 1501 (2012).  
 93. See, e.g., Hendrik Hartog, Pigs and Positivism, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 899, 930 (describing 
pig-keeping law “as an arena of conflict, rather than as an unfolding text”); Kyle G. Volk, The 
Consequentialist State: Public Law and the Release of Energy in Nineteenth Century America, 57 
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 232, 235 (2017) (discussing examples of the “cat-and-mouse dynamic . . . [of] 
regulation spurring entrepreneurial innovation, which in turn prompted regulatory innovation”). 
 94. See, e.g., Claire A. Hill, Repugnant Business Models: Preliminary Thoughts on a Research 
and Policy Agenda, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 973, 975–76 (2017) (discussing illegal conduct by 
the Wells Fargo employees).  
 95. James Rufus Koren, Wells Fargo to Pay $185 Million Settlement for ‘Outrageous’ Sales 
Culture, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2016, 3:10 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-wells-fargo-
settlement-20160907-snap-story.html [https://perma.cc/S8ML-4U4J]. 
 96. Id. 
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public outcry, ongoing litigation, and financial impact.97 Other recent 
illustrative cases include the Volkswagen emissions scandal and 
Citibank’s deceptive marketing of credit card add-on products.98 
More mundane compliance failures, while perhaps less morally 
culpable, also lack social value. For example, Halliburton recently paid 
$18.3 million to a thousand workers it had misclassified as exempt from 
overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act.99 Compliance 
failures come in all sizes, of course, and many examples amount to 
smaller dollar values in fines or settlements or may go undetected.100 
Whether the result of negligent or knowing failure to comply with 
existing laws and regulations, this rule breaking has no apparent 
motivation besides perhaps a general profit-making goal.101 
The examples envisioned by the corporate law literature, such as 
traffic violations and river pollution, generally fit into this range of 
corporate activity. Scholars debate whether these activities provide 
societal benefit when a cost-benefit analysis would result in net profits 
for the corporation, but they have not identified social value other than 
profits for the companies engaged in the illegal activity. 
 
 97. Michael Corkery, Wells Fargo Struggling in Aftermath of Fraud Scandal, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/13/business/dealbook/wells-fargo-earnings-
report.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/WU9E-WNDE]; Jen Wieczner, Here’s How Much Wells 
Fargo’s Fake Accounts Scandal Is Hurting the Bank, FORTUNE (Jan. 13, 2017), 
http://fortune.com/2017/01/13/wells-fargo-fake-accounts-scandal-closing-branches-earnings 
[https://perma.cc/9CDS-CWJU]. 
 98. Danny Hakim, Aaron M. Kessler & Jack Ewing, As Volkswagen Pushed to Be No. 1, 
Ambitions Fueled a Scandal, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/
2015/09/27/business/as-vw-pushed-to-be-no-1-ambitions-fueled-a-scandal.html?action=click& 
contentCollection=Business%20Day&region=Footer&module=WhatsNext&version=WhatsNe
xt&contentID=WhatsNext&moduleDetail=undefined&pgtype=Multimedia [https://perma.cc/ 
NY7G-VK4H]; CFPB Orders Citibank to Pay $700 Million in Consumer Relief for Illegal Credit 
Card Practices, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (July 21, 2015), 
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-orders-citibank-to-pay-700-million-
in-consumer-relief-for-illegal-credit-card-practices/ [https://perma.cc/MJR8-FBTQ]. 
 99. Halliburton Pays Nearly $18.3 Million in Overtime Owed to More Than 1,000 Employees 
Nationwide After US Labor Department Investigation, DEP’T OF LABOR (Sept. 22, 2015), 
https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/whd/whd20150922-0 [https://perma.cc/CBQ4-AYET].  
 100. Cases often settle, sometimes without an admission of wrongdoing by the corporation. 
BRANDON L. GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL: HOW PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE WITH 
CORPORATIONS 61 (2014). 
 101. For a sampling of the growing body of literature on compliance, see Miriam Hechler 
Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. REV. 949 (2009); Sean J. Griffith, Corporate 
Governance in an Era of Compliance, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2075 (2016); Donald C. 
Langevoort, Cultures of Compliance, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 933 (2017); William S. Laufer, 
Corporate Liability, Risk Shifting, and the Paradox of Compliance, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1343 (1999); 
Veronica Root, The Monitor-“Client” Relationship, 100 VA. L. REV. 523 (2014).  
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B. Disobedience with the Potential for Innovation or Change: 
Innovators, Dissenters, Rebels, and Lobbyists 
In contrast to the above, a wide array of examples exists of 
corporations violating the law as part of an effort at entrepreneurship, 
innovation, or legal change. This activity is diverse. For example, it 
includes the development of new technology that might push the 
regulatory envelope or raise questions of legal classification. It also 
includes situations in which a company does not have an innovative 
business model or product but instead engages in an act of 
disobedience or defiance as part of an effort to change or clarify the 
law.102 
These cases involve not only transgressions of the law or refusals 
to comply but also the potential that the conduct is in the greater 
interest of the public. These categories are admittedly porous and 
debatable.103 The important observation is that when entrepreneurial 
activity produces useful technology or innovative services that improve 
citizens’ well-being, productivity, or quality of life, a justification may 
exist for the disobedience that goes beyond a simple cost-benefit 
analysis of a corporation’s gain.104 In addition, there is informational 
value in disobedience that points to areas of law that might be 
outdated, that conflict with the law of other jurisdictions, or that reflect 
a political or market failure.105 Further, the benefits that might flow 
 
 102. See Wu, supra note 90, at 17 (“At bottom, law avoidance is complex: it can represent 
social disorder or unfair opportunism, yet also, paradoxically, play an important role in the 
democratic process and the evolution of a legal system.”); id. at 18 (“[T]here is a narrower 
category of lawbreaking that raises questions about which there exists true uncertainty in the law 
and . . . division of public opinion or an underdeveloped debate . . . . [A] debate over such 
questions can be a healthy process, and . . . is not one with a predictable outcome.”).  
 103. Cf. Peñalver & Katyal, supra note 25, at 1128 (“The many discussions of intentional 
lawbreaking within legal philosophy reflect three broad approaches: one rooted in the dignity of 
individual conscience, one oriented toward the correction of imperfections in the majoritarian 
political process, and one celebrating a pluralistic conception of legal interpretation.”). 
 104. See, e.g., Ross Levine & Yona Rubinstein, Smart and Illicit: Who Becomes An 
Entrepreneur and Do They Earn More?, 132 Q.J. ECON. 963, 963 (2017). Levine and Rubinstein 
note: 
Economists since Adam Smith have emphasized that entrepreneurs spur 
improvements in living standards. For example, Schumpeter argues that entrepreneurs 
drive economic growth by undertaking risky ventures that create and introduce new 
goods, services, and production processes that displace old businesses. [Various 
scholars] stress that the human capital of entrepreneurs plays a unique role in shaping 
the productivity of firms and the growth rate of entire economies. 
Id. 
 105. See EDUARDO MOISÉS PEÑALVER & SONIA K. KATYAL, PROPERTY OUTLAWS: HOW 
SQUATTERS, PIRATES, AND PROTESTERS IMPROVE THE LAW OF OWNERSHIP 172 (2010) (noting 
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from corporate disobedience aimed at clarifying or changing the law 
may accrue to others where the company pushes for broad legal change 
rather than an individual regulatory exemption or waiver.106 
To examine the contours of corporate disobedience, this section 
reviews a range of examples, both historical and contemporary.107 This 
account is not offered in the spirit of justification or advocacy but 
rather aims to broaden the debate. 
1. Innovation and Entrepreneurship.  Throughout history, 
companies at the cutting edge of technology have provided a rich set 
of examples of corporate disobedience. In some instances, corporate 
disobedience stems from legal uncertainty as new technology develops; 
it can be unclear whether a new product or service is definitively illegal 
or whether it can be characterized as outside the reach of existing 
law.108 Companies may also be willing to break the law while 
establishing their technology, with the hope that they will be able to 
change the law before regulators enforce it against them.109 
Uber is the most salient example of corporate disobedience in the 
early twenty-first century.110 The ride-hailing startup has been 
 
in the intellectual property context that “[c]ases of particularly widespread free riding offer 
valuable information concerning the degree to which entitlements may be outdated or the result 
of some kind of political or market failure that might, on its own merits, justify legal reform or 
redistribution”); see also Wu, supra note 90, at 17 (“The laws on the books represent a judgment 
at a certain time and place, by one generation, that reflects both prevailing norms and 
technological reality of that time, yet may have little to do with what following generations think 
about an issue.”). 
 106. See, e.g., Michael R. Dennis, Katherine Rowan, Richard Feinberg, Richard Widdows & 
Richard Crable, Corporate Civil Disobedience in the Consumer Interest, 6 ADVANCING THE 
CONSUMER INTEREST 16, 18 (1994) (discussing corporate defiance in the consumer interest and 
noting that “the defiance is in the greater interest of the public” and “the benefits will be enhanced 
if the defiance is successful in implementing legal change so that other companies are allowed to 
follow suit”). 
 107. This Article uses the term “spectrum” to reflect this diversity of examples but does not 
mean to suggest that the types of activity can be plotted precisely on a scale. 
 108. For a discussion of lawbreaking as part of a process of legal interpretation and dissent, 
see Cover, supra note 25, at 46–48; Peñalver & Katyal, supra note 25, at 1130–31. 
 109. See Pollman & Barry, supra note 10, at 399 (“Sometimes regulatory entrepreneurs 
proactively engage regulators, but often they simply push forward with the business while hoping 
that regulators and enforcement agencies will not come knocking.”). 
 110. See id. at 398–400 (discussing Uber as a “regulatory entrepreneur” that operated in legal 
gray areas and strategically engaged in legal disobedience as part of its efforts to change its 
regulatory environment); Biber et al., supra note 90, at 1569 (“[B]esides causing industry 
upheaval, Uber, Airbnb, and other applications of the platform economy often are also arguably 
illegal, if not patently illegal, in many jurisdictions. They are routinely skirting and flouting 
existing federal, state, and local laws.”). 
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enmeshed in a series of scandals involving questionable or even illegal 
activity, ranging from using a tool the company developed called 
Greyball to evade law enforcement officials, to testing self-driving 
vehicles on public roads without obtaining the required permits.111 
Many of Uber’s legal woes fall into the category of unlawful conduct 
with little or no redeeming societal value beyond corporate profit, as 
described in the section above. However, at the center of Uber’s 
controversial story is a business that uses technology to transform 
transportation—a company that is willing to disobey existing laws in 
order to upend the taxi industry, change how people get around towns 
and cities, and perhaps one day even replace car ownership.112 
The Uber co-founders developed the core concept for the 
company’s business in 2008: a smartphone app that connects drivers 
and riders and takes a cut of the ride’s cost.113 In the eyes of the co-
founders, the app had the potential “to take on an entrenched taxi 
industry that they felt was more interested in blocking competition 
than in serving customers.”114 By 2010, the company launched the 
service in San Francisco and shortly thereafter received a cease-and-
desist letter from the San Francisco Metro Transit Authority and 
California Public Utilities Commission.115 The company’s response: 
simply changing its name from UberCab to Uber and otherwise 
ignoring the regulators’ letter.116 
The company continued to operate and expand to cities across the 
United States and around the world. It developed a playbook for local 
 
 111. Davey Alba, A Short History of the Many, Many Ways Uber Screwed Up, WIRED (June 
21, 2017, 2:42 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/timeline-uber-crises [https://perma.cc/Z5CC-
25Y8]; Alan Ohnsman, Uber’s Defiance of California on Self-Driving Car Rules Sparks Legal 
Showdown, FORBES (Dec. 16, 2016, 7:29 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/alanohnsman/
2016/12/16/uber-doubles-down-on-decision-to-defy-california-on-self-driving-car-rules/#30fc
a7f26e7a [https://perma.cc/ZM2W-6BHH]; see also Douglas MacMillan & Newley Purnell, 
Smoke, Then Fire: Uber Knowingly Leased Unsafe Cars to Drivers, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 3, 2017), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/smoke-then-fire-uber-knowingly-leased-unsafe-cars-to-drivers-
1501786430 [https://perma.cc/Z8UL-TEKT]. 
 112. See LASHINSKY, supra note 8, at 22, 104–05. 
 113. Id. at 80–81. 
 114. BRAD STONE, THE UPSTARTS: HOW UBER, AIRBNB, AND THE KILLER COMPANIES OF 
THE NEW SILICON VALLEY ARE CHANGING THE WORLD 49 (describing, based on interviews, 
the Uber co-founders’ views from the early days of the company); see also Rafi Mohammed, 
Regulation Is Hurting Cabs and Helping Uber, HARV. BUS. REV. (July 9, 2014), 
https://hbr.org/2014/07/regulation-is-hurting-cabs-and-helping-uber [https://perma.cc/U7Y4-
FUHW] (“Much of [Uber’s] spectacular growth has been fueled by outdated regulation.”). 
 115. LASHINSKY, supra note 8, at 90. 
 116. Id. at 86, 90. 
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launches that started with assessing regulations but not necessarily 
complying with them. One of the Uber employees who oversaw these 
early city launches explained: “I would go through every single clause 
of the regs and try and piece together where we could have a 
problem.”117 Putting this strategy in context, technology journalist 
Adam Lashinsky observed: “A normal company would have arranged 
meetings with regulators to signal their intentions; Uber approached 
each launch like a guerilla attack, with no need to warn the enemy 
first.”118 The company was aware that many regulators viewed its 
operations as illegal, yet it characterized itself as a technology company 
to which taxi laws did not apply.119 Uber repeatedly paid fines and 
settlements as a cost of doing business, but it did not waver from its 
playbook.120 As of early 2014, Uber was engaged in seventeen active 
regulatory fights across the country, and the number continued to 
mushroom for years after.121 
Uber combined this regulatory disobedience with lobbying, public 
relations, and grassroots support from drivers and riders, which it 
leveraged to obtain legal changes in many jurisdictions.122 It did not 
always succeed, and it pulled out of some locations, at least 
temporarily.123 But, in many instances, its strategy of legal disobedience 
combined with a strong offensive approach to gaining popularity 
 
 117. Id. at 97. 
 118. Id. 
 119. See id. at 106. 
 120. For example, when the company faced a law in Paris making its “UberPop” service 
illegal, the company refused to shut down and instead paid drivers’ fines. Liz Alderman, Uber’s 
French Resistance, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (June 3, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/07/
magazine/ubers-french-resistance.html [https://perma.cc/49WD-2P8E]. 
 121. LASHINSKY, supra note 8, at 108. 
 122. Id. at 107–08; see Pollman & Barry, supra note 10, at 388. 
 123. Douglas MacMillan & Rachel Emma Silverman, Uber, Lyft Shut Down in Austin Over 
Fingerprint Vote, WALL ST. J. (May 9, 2016, 8:20 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/texas-capital-
city-votes-to-keep-fingerprinting-for-uber-lyft-drivers-1462796972 [https://perma.cc/SKV9-
GS7H]; David Meyer, Uber Pulls Out of Hungary Thanks to New Regulations, FORTUNE (July 
13, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/07/13/uber-hungary-ban [https://perma.cc/MZ9P-D85U]; New 
Regulations Prompt Uber to Exit Denmark, FORTUNE (Mar. 28, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/
03/28/new-regulations-prompt-uber-to-exit-denmark [https://perma.cc/H5GC-DHAZ]; Andrea 
Peterson, In Kansas, Uber’s Campaign Didn’t Just Backfire—It Knocked Out the Legislature’s E-
Mail System, WASH. POST (Apr. 7, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
switch/wp/2015/04/07/in-kansas-ubers-campaign-didnt-just-backfire-it-knocked-out-the-
legislatures-e-mail-system/?utm_term=.0ce9db632709 [https://perma.cc/43J8-LUAG]; Mark 
Scott, Uber’s No-Holds-Barred Expansion Strategy Fizzles in Germany, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/04/technology/ubers-no-holds-barred-expansion-strategy-
fizzles-in-germany.html [https://perma.cc/VB92-X878]. 
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worked to its advantage and catalyzed change—not just for its own 
benefit, but for its competitors’ as well.124 Even if Uber’s success 
ultimately comes to an end, the ride-sharing model that Uber helped 
to develop will likely live on, and competitors or successors will benefit 
from the regulatory environment Uber helped shape.125 
Myriad other examples exist of innovative companies stretching, 
disregarding, or even intentionally disobeying laws or legal orders in 
their quests to develop new technology.126 This willingness to upend the 
established order may in fact be part of innovation culture and a 
personality trait of many entrepreneurs.127 According to recent 
research, people who become entrepreneurs are more likely than 
others to have received high scores on aptitude tests and to have 
engaged in more disruptive, illicit activities in their youth.128 
 
 124. See, e.g., LASHINSKY, supra note 8, at 108 (“These battles played out almost everywhere 
Uber—and Lyft often behind it—went.”); Daniel Roberts, Uber’s Competitors in NYC Are 
Growing Like Crazy, YAHOO! FINANCE (Mar. 10, 2017), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/ubers-
competitors-in-nyc-are-growing-like-crazy-144556302.html [https://perma.cc/Y8PC-VJJM] 
(“Lyft, Juno, and Gett are all climbing just at a time when Uber is vulnerable, beset by a series of 
separate scandals . . . .”); Serena Saitto, Inside Big Taxi’s Dirty War with Uber, BLOOMBERG 
(Mar. 11, 2015, 5:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-11/inside-big-taxi-s-
dirty-war-with-uber [https://perma.cc/TX6R-CXU4] (“[U]ber’s strategy has been to launch 
services regardless of the rules and then leverage its popularity to force regulators to adapt. So 
far, that approach has succeeded in about 30 markets in North America . . . .”).  
 125. See Jack Stewart, As Uber Crumbles, Lyft Builds Its Future, WIRED (June 14, 2017, 5:06 
PM) https://www.wired.com/story/uber-lyft-crisis [https://perma.cc/B2Q9-LLYN] (discussing 
how Lyft could “reap the rewards” from Uber’s “rough 2017”); Ben Thompson, Intel, MobilEye, 
and Smiling Curves, STRATECHERY (Mar. 14, 2017), https://stratechery.com/2017/intel-mobileye-
and-smiling-curves [https://perma.cc/5NLM-JYW8] (“Uber is the biggest player in ride-sharing, 
at least in most Western countries, although Lyft is lurking should Uber implode; Didi is dominant 
in China, while Southeast Asia has a number of smaller competitors.”). But see Susie Cagle, How 
a Start-Up That Wouldn’t Break the Rules Was Forced to Fail, PAC. STANDARD (Jan. 27, 2015), 
https://psmag.com/economics/night-school-failed-because-it-followed-law [https://perma.cc/ 
5L5N-QDLB] (noting that some would-be competitors of ride-hailing companies have failed after 
trying to work with local regulators). 
 126. Elizabeth Pollman, The Rise of Regulatory Affairs in Innovative Startups, in THE 
HANDBOOK ON LAW AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES (forthcoming 2019), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2880818 [https://perma.cc/9K35-3ULR]. 
 127. The term “corporate disobedience” has also been used to describe the “stealth 
innovation” of employees purposely “bending or even breaking select internal rules” within large 
corporations that have extensive policies and control systems. Thomas Wedell-Wedellsborg, The 
Case for Corporate Disobedience, HARV. BUS. REV. (June 2, 2014), https://hbr.org/2014/06/the-
case-for-corporate-disobedience [https://perma.cc/M86W-WS9N]. 
 128. Levine & Rubinstein, supra note 104, at 963. Entrepreneurs may rationalize their 
behavior and business strategies through a process psychologists call moral disengagement, for 
example, thinking certain regulations are unnecessary and thus that it is not bad to violate them. 
Noam Scheiber, The Shkreli Syndrome: Youthful Trouble, Tech Success, Then a Fall, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/14/business/entrepreneur-young-trouble
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It is not only startups that bump up against laws and regulations. 
Industry giant Google, now organized under the holding company 
Alphabet, has fought numerous legal battles, sometimes succeeding in 
claims that its technology does not in fact violate the law and at other 
times losing and eventually being forced to pay fines and change its 
approach. From privacy violations incurred by collecting street views 
around the globe to copyright issues over its “moonshot” project of 
scanning all the world’s books,129 Google and its affiliates have often 
tested legal boundaries. It may be unfair to characterize any of 
Google’s activity as outright intentional disobedience. Yet, the 
company has notably displayed a nuanced understanding that its 
overall business inevitably involves legal violations and that it must 
proceed nonetheless with this approach. Google’s general counsel 
explained: 
We do the best we can to make sure we’re complying with all the 
present and future rules out there, and we’ve usually gotten it right. 
Our rule of thumb has been if our products are creating value for 
people and society, courts will usually come out on the side of 
delivering that kind of benefit. That’s not to say that there aren’t 
surprises along the way. For example, we’ve launched in a country 
only to discover that there’s a 20-year-old law on the books that 
creates an unforeseen issue—and then we have to adjust our 
implementation.130 
 
.html?ref=dealbook&=undefined&auth=login-email&_r=1 [https://perma.cc/FYF8-MGZ8] 
(quoting psychologist Laurence Steinberg). 
 129. See, e.g., Robinson Meyer, After 10 Years, Google Books Is Legal, ATLANTIC (Oct. 20, 
2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/10/fair-use-transformative-leval-
google-books/411058 [https://perma.cc/AUW5-PJYP] (explaining the decade-long legal battle 
over Google Books in which the Second Circuit ultimately ruled that it was fair use for the 
company to scan millions of copyrighted books and make portions available online without 
copyright holders’ permission); Mark Scott, Google Fined Record $2.7 Billion on E.U. Antitrust 
Ruling, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/27/technology/eu-google-
fine.html [https://perma.cc/BY3W-675U] (discussing the European Commission’s antitrust ruling 
and fine against Google); David Streitfeld, Google Concedes That Drive-By Prying Violated 
Privacy, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/13/technology/google-
pays-fine-over-street-view-privacy-breach.html?pagewanted=all [https://perma.cc/U38U-9EJG] 
(noting that Google “acknowledged to state officials that it had violated people’s privacy during 
its Street View mapping project when it casually scooped up passwords, e-mails and other 
personal information from unsuspecting computer users,” and that it settled a case brought by 
thirty-eight states); Jeffrey Toobin, Google’s Moon Shot: The Quest for the Universal Library, 
NEW YORKER (Feb. 5, 2007), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2007/02/05/googles-moon-
shot [https://perma.cc/4XW7-T2AW] (discussing Google Books).  
 130. Sharon Driscoll, Lawyering at the Edge of Innovation: A Conversation with Kent Walker, 
Google’s General Counsel and Senior Vice President, STAN. LAW., Fall 2016, at 27.  
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Other technology companies have sometimes taken approaches 
that are openly aimed at meeting the letter, but not the spirit, of the 
law. For example, when France’s parliament acted out of concern for 
small local bookstores by passing a law that banned retailers from 
offering free shipping or discounts over 5 percent on books, Amazon 
responded by charging one cent for shipping.131 
Another technology giant, Apple, found itself in a difficult 
position when asked by the FBI to “unlock” an iPhone used by a 
terrorist; Apple chose to resist.132 The request came amidst an ongoing 
and heated public debate about how to balance the privacy afforded by 
encryption with law enforcement’s need for access.133 When talks 
between the FBI and Apple reached an impasse, a magistrate judge 
issued an order compelling Apple to provide technical assistance to 
allow the FBI to bypass or disable the iPhone security functions.134 
Apple CEO Tim Cook responded with a strongly worded open letter 
to the company’s customers, stating: “We oppose this order, which has 
 
 131. See Alison Griswold, France Banned Free Shipping. So Amazon Made It Cost One Cent., 
SLATE: MONEYBOX (July 11, 2014), http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2014/07/11/france_
banned_free_shipping_so_amazon_made_it_cost_one_cent.html [https://perma.cc/PG5M-
5RGR]; Sam Schechner, Amazon Shelves French Book Discounts, WALL ST. J. (July 10, 2014, 
11:32 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/amazon-shelves-french-book-discounts-1405006355 
[https://perma.cc/GQL3-YQ5R]. 
 132. Eric Lichtblau & Katie Benner, Apple Fights Order to Unlock San Bernardino Gunman’s 
iPhone, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/18/technology/apple-
timothy-cook-fbi-san-bernardino.html [https://perma.cc/F8PV-VDAM]; see also Apple Inc.’s 
Motion to Vacate Order Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist Agents in Search, and Opposition to 
Government’s Motion to Compel Assistance at 4–5, In re Search of an Apple iPhone Seized 
During the Execution of a Search Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300, Cal. License Plate 35KGD203, 
No. ED 15-0451M, 2016 WL 618401 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2016) (requesting that the court vacate 
an order that directed Apple to assist in the search of a seized iPhone); Kim Zetter, Apple’s FBI 
Battle Is Complicated. Here’s What’s Really Going On, WIRED (Feb. 18, 2016, 1:15 PM), 
https://www.wired.com/2016/02/apples-fbi-battle-is-complicated-heres-whats-really-going-on 
[https://perma.cc/CE3M-SS3E] (“But this isn’t about unlocking a phone; rather, it’s about 
ordering Apple to create a new software tool to eliminate specific security protections the 
company built into its phone software to protect customer data . . . it’s an after-market backdoor 
to be used selectively on phones the government is investigating.”).  
 133. Zetter, supra note 132. In a similar case in New York, the court ruled in Apple’s favor 
on statutory grounds. See In re Order Requiring Apple, Inc. to Assist in the Execution of a Search 
Warrant Issued by this Court, 149 F. Supp. 3d 341, 344 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (holding that Apple was 
under no obligation to assist with the search warrant, based on the fact that Congress has 
considered and decided not to adopt legislation that would support the Government’s 
interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a)(2012)). 
 134. Lichtblau & Benner, supra note 132; Kim Zetter, Magistrate Orders Apple to Help FBI 
Hack San Bernardino Shooter’s Phone, WIRED (Feb. 16, 2016), https://www.wired.com/
2016/02/magistrate-orders-apple-to-help-fbi-hack-phone-of-san-bernardino-shooter [https:// 
perma.cc/QSF4-NGML]. 
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implications far beyond the legal case at hand. This moment calls for 
public discussion, and we want our customers and people around the 
country to understand what is at stake.”135 Cook explained the deeper 
tensions and complexity in the privacy and security debate, noting that 
“[c]ompromising the security of our personal information can 
ultimately put our personal safety at risk” and that “[Apple has] even 
put that data out of our own reach, because we believe the contents of 
your iPhone are none of our business.”136 
Apple then formally filed an opposition to the magistrate’s order 
and asked the court to withdraw its demand.137 This move represented 
a strong stance against compliance with the government’s request and 
the judge’s order. Other major technology companies, including 
Microsoft, Google, and Facebook, filed a brief in support of Apple’s 
defiance.138 In addition to pushing Apple for its technical assistance, 
the FBI called on Congress to pass legislation clarifying the authority 
of law enforcement to access private data.139 Meanwhile, the FBI was 
 
 135. Tim Cook, A Message to Our Customers, APPLE (Feb. 16, 2016), 
https://www.apple.com/customer-letter [https://perma.cc/RZE7-KXPR]. 
 136. Id. For a discussion of whether a corporation has a constitutional right to privacy and 
whether it can assert such a right on behalf of corporate participants or users against the 
government, see generally Elizabeth Pollman, A Corporate Right to Privacy, 99 MINN. L. REV. 27 
(2014). 
 137. Katie Benner, Eric Lichtblau & Nick Wingfield, Apple Goes to Court, and F.B.I. Presses 
Congress to Settle iPhone Privacy Fight, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/
2016/02/26/technology/apple-unlock-iphone-fbi-san-bernardino-brief.html [https://perma.cc/ 
7QFJ-N7X6]. Apple claimed that the order overstepped the All Writs Act and the company’s 
First and Fifth Amendment rights. See generally Clark D. Cunningham, Apple and the American 
Revolution: Remembering Why We Have the Fourth Amendment, 126 YALE L.J. FORUM 216 
(2016) (discussing the Apple case); Steven R. Morrison, Breaking iPhones Under CALEA and 
the All Writs Act: Why the Government Was (Mostly) Right, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 2039 (2017) 
(same). 
 138. Brief of Amici Curiae Amazon.com, Box, Cisco Systems, Dropbox, Evernote, Facebook, 
Google, Microsoft, Mozilla, Nest, Pinterest, Slack, Snapchat, Whatsapp, and Yahoo in Support 
of Apple, Inc. at 1–4, In re Search of an Apple iPhone Seized During the Execution of a Search 
Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300, Cal. License Plate 35KGD203, No. ED 15-0451M, 2016 WL 
618401 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2016); Benner et al., supra note 137. Amicus curiae briefs from various 
Apple supporters flowed in and argued, in sum:  
[A] court order that favored the government would: run counter to [the 
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act] and the [All Writs Act]; violate 
Apple’s First Amendment rights; violate Apple’s due process rights; undermine 
freedom of speech in the digital age; create a public safety threat; damage the American 
economy; undermine Apple’s business strategy and corporate identity; encourage cell 
phone theft; undermine consumers’ trust in tech companies and their products; 
undermine free press; and enable rogue countries to invent vulnerability-creating 
backdoors.  
Morrison, supra note 137, at 2042. 
 139. Benner et al., supra note 137. 
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also working to find a way to bypass the iPhone’s protection without 
Apple’s help.140 Ultimately, an anonymous hacker helped the FBI 
access the iPhone data, thereby ending the legal standoff before the 
California court issued a final ruling.141 Understanding that a similar 
situation could arise again in the future, Apple released a statement 
that it would “continue to increase the security of [its] products” and 
push the government to disclose the third-party tool used to exploit the 
iPhone’s security vulnerability.142 
2. Battles of Federalism.  In addition to the context of 
entrepreneurship and innovation, corporate disobedience also arises in 
situations of conflicting laws from different jurisdictions or levels of 
government. In fact, the very first Supreme Court case on the 
constitutional rights of corporations involved state and federal tensions 
brought to the fore by a corporation defying a legal mandate. 
The Bank of the United States, championed by Alexander 
Hamilton and created by Congress, refused to pay a tax that populist 
state lawmakers levied on a bank branch in Savannah, Georgia.143 The 
bank headquarters in Philadelphia instructed the Savannah branch to 
refuse to comply with the law, hoping to “bring the question before the 
Supreme Court of the United States.”144 A Georgia tax collector, “with 
force and arms,” entered the Savannah branch and took two boxes of 
silver coins.145 The case made its way to the Supreme Court, as the bank 
hoped, but the Court ruled on a preliminary issue regarding diversity 
jurisdiction and sent the issue of whether states could impose taxes on 
federal entities back to the lower court.146 Shortly after this decision, 
Congress famously failed to renew the bank’s charter.147 It was not until 
a decade later, in 1819, that the bank’s disobedience was vindicated on 
 
 140. Alina Selyukh, The FBI Has Successfully Unlocked the iPhone Without Apple’s Help, 
NPR (Mar. 28, 2016, 6:20 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/03/28/472192080/
the-fbi-has-successfully-unlocked-the-iphone-without-apples-help [https://perma.cc/HB4U-
GTLV]. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Bank of the U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 63 (1809); ADAM WINKLER, WE THE 
CORPORATIONS 40–41 (2018).  
 144. WINKLER, supra note 143, at 41. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Bank of the U.S., 9 U.S. at 87–88, 92. 
 147. Victor Morawetz, The Power of Congress to Enact Incorporation Laws and to Regulate 
Corporations, 26 HARV. L. REV. 667, 668 (1913) (“The charter of the bank expired in 1811 and 
for political reasons Congress refused to renew it . . . .”). 
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the merits. In the landmark decision of McCulloch v. Maryland,148 the 
Supreme Court struck down a state tax directed at the re-chartered 
Bank of the United States.149 
As illustrated by Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, corporate 
disobedience commonly arises when there is a mismatch between local 
or state law and federal law. This results in corporations being in 
violation of law, at least in one jurisdiction or at one level of 
government, for some period of time while the laws are in the process 
of changing or being clarified.150 Examples of this point are plentiful in 
recent years. 
For instance, in 2016, the San Francisco Board of Supervisors 
passed one of the most stringent restrictions on short-term rentals in 
the country, making it illegal for Airbnb and similar short-term rental 
platforms to collect fees from facilitating rentals that had not properly 
registered with the city.151 Before this city ordinance, Airbnb had 
established its popular platform for short-term rentals by engaging in 
regulatory disputes across numerous jurisdictions.152 Thus, 
unsurprisingly, Airbnb did not simply accept the law as it was and 
conform to its dictates; instead, the company sued the city and 
challenged the new law in court. Airbnb claimed that the local 
ordinance violated the First Amendment, the Communications 
Decency Act, and the Stored Communications Act.153 A federal court 
 
 148. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
 149. Id. at 436 (“[T]he states have no power, by taxation or otherwise, to . . . impede . . . the 
operations of the constitutional laws enacted by congress . . . . We are unanimously of opinion, 
that the law passed by the legislature of Maryland, imposing a tax on the Bank of the United 
States, is unconstitutional and void.”). 
 150. Conflicting laws or legal requests may even span international jurisdictions. See, e.g., 
Danny Hakim & Jack Ewing, VW Refuses to Give American States Documents in Emissions 
Inquiries, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/09/business/vw-refuses-to-
give-us-states-documents-in-emissions-inquiries.html [https://perma.cc/38EH-3S4Y] (discussing 
Volkswagen’s claim that it could not respond to U.S. investigators’ requests without violating 
German privacy laws). 
 151. Emily Green, SF Major Blow to Airbnb with Tough Short-Term Rental Law, SF GATE 
(Nov. 15, 2016, 10:26 PM), http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/SF-deals-major-blow-to-Airbnb-
with-tough-10617319.php [https://perma.cc/7DW5-6XSX]; Dan Levine & Heather Somerville, 
Judge Rejects Airbnb Bid to Halt San Francisco Ordinance, REUTERS (Nov. 8, 2016), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/airbnb-sanfrancisco-ruling-idUSL1N1D923N [https://perma.cc/ 
SDV3-WAPP].  
 152. See LEIGH GALLAGHER, THE AIRBNB STORY 125–29, 133–37 (2017); see also Pollman 
& Barry, supra note 10, at 401, 405–06, 412–13 (discussing Airbnb’s regulatory strategy and 
outlook). 
 153. An Update for Our Community in San Francisco, AIRBNBCITIZEN (June 27, 2016), 
https://san-francisco.airbnbcitizen.com/an-update-for-our-community-in-san-francisco [https:// 
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denied Airbnb’s motion for a preliminary injunction, indicating it was 
not persuaded on the merits.154 Subsequently, Airbnb settled with San 
Francisco, agreeing to a compromise solution of having a streamlined 
registration process on the Airbnb site.155 The company’s temporary 
recalcitrance evolved into collaboration. New startups inspired by 
Airbnb are emerging and navigating the regulatory environment.156 
In another example of federalism-related disobedience, marijuana 
companies have flourished as more states have legalized medical and 
recreational use. As discussed above, although these businesses may be 
engaged in legal activity in their home states, they are currently 
violating federal law.157 Under the Controlled Substances Act, it is 
illegal to distribute or dispense marijuana, which falls within the 
definition of a controlled substance.158 The conflict between state and 
federal marijuana laws means that companies are engaging in a form 
of disobedience by operating their business in this industry. 
 
perma.cc/7S7G-CEY6]; see also Hye-Jin Kim, Supes Crack Down on Airbnb, Scofflaw Hosts, S.F. 
PUB. PRESS (June 14, 2015, 3:27 PM), http://sfpublicpress.org/news/2016-06/supes-crack-down-
on-unregistered-home-sharing [https://perma.cc/Q49W-KDHY] (explaining that, when San 
Francisco passed the ordinance in the summer of 2016, only a fraction of the address listings on 
Airbnb’s site were legally registered with the Office for Short-Term Rental). 
 154. Airbnb, Inc. v. City and Cty. of S.F., 217 F. Supp. 3d 1066, 1080 (N.D. Cal. 2016). Airbnb 
has engaged in similar battles in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Katie Benner, Airbnb Sues Over 
New Law Regulating New York Rentals, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/
2016/10/22/technology/new-york-passes-law-airbnb.html?_r=2&referer= [https://perma.cc/W6J3-
S7ZY] (discussing a lawsuit Airbnb filed seeking to enjoin enforcement of a New York law on 
the grounds that it violated the company’s constitutional rights and was inconsistent with the 
Communications Decency Act). But see Joshua Brustein, Airbnb to Drop New York City Lawsuit 
Over Short-Term Rentals, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 2, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2016-12-03/airbnb-to-drop-new-york-city-lawsuit-over-short-term-rentals [https:// 
perma.cc/B84N-8LYJ] (discussing Airbnb’s decision to drop the lawsuit after reaching an 
agreement with regulators). 
 155. Katie Benner, Airbnb Settles Lawsuit With Its Hometown, San Francisco, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/01/technology/airbnb-san-francisco-settle-
registration-lawsuit.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/FTU9-5M6D]. 
 156. Cory Weinberg, Airbnb Fuels Boutique Rental Startups, but Regulatory Risks Loom, 
INFORMATION (Jan. 10, 2018), https://www.theinformation.com/articles/airbnb-fuels-boutique-
rental-startups-but-regulatory-risks-loom [https://perma.cc/TNC9-RMW3]. 
 157. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 20, at 857 (“Nearly half of the states allow medical use 
of marijuana . . . . However, marijuana remains a Schedule 1 controlled substance under the 
federal Controlled Substances Act, along with opioids, like heroin, and hallucinogenics, like 
LSD.”); see also Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 
YALE L.J. 1256, 1258 (2009) (discussing competing visions of the state as “servant, insider, and 
ally” as well as “dissenter, rival, and challenger”). 
 158. 21 U.S.C. § 812 Schedule I(C)(10) (2018).  
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Nonetheless, the industry has experienced rapid growth, all in the 
shadow of threats from the federal government.159 
3. Moral Stances and Claims for Rights.  Another set of examples 
of corporate disobedience involves companies that violate or refuse to 
comply with laws that are moralistic in nature. Conversely, some 
companies engage in disobedience as a result of their own claimed 
moral stances against laws or civil liberties. These cases are of a 
distinctly different flavor. 
The response of nineteenth-century liquor businesses to the 
temperance movement and Sunday laws provides a colorful 
illustration.160 During the 1840s and ’50s, in movements spanning cities 
and towns across the country, temperance and Sabbath reformers 
sought to impose moral order through regulations that prohibited the 
sale of alcohol and restricted work and play on Sunday, the day of 
worship for Christians.161 Reformers justified these restrictions with 
claims of majority support for moral and religious norms but were met 
with dissent from a diverse group of anti-prohibitionists including 
Jewish, Catholic, and Seventh Day Baptist communities, immigrants, 
labor advocates, and liquor businesses whose owners made their living 
selling alcohol.162 Historian Kyle Volk has traced the resistance efforts 
of these anti-prohibitionists, including the disobedience of 
“[n]umerous shop-keepers and tavern-owners [that] registered their 
discontent by blatantly staying open.”163 
Ad hoc and informal responses evolved into more organized 
opposition to alcohol prohibition.164 Liquor dealers, brewers, 
 
 159. See Chemerinsky, supra note 20, at 858 (noting that revenues from marijuana sold 
through “legal” channels has grown to nearly $6 billion); Scheuer, supra note 22, at 513–20 
(discussing the legal issues that the marijuana industry faces); see also DOJ Bullies Delaware into 
Suspending Medical Marijuana Dispensary Program, MARIJUANA POL’Y PROJECT, 
https://blog.mpp.org/medical-marijuana/doj-bullies-delaware-into-suspending-medical-
marijuana-dispensary-program [https://perma.cc/B4KN-EFFC] (noting that U.S. attorneys in 
Delaware and Washington threatened federal enforcement against state-sponsored medical 
marijuana dispensaries). 
 160. Because general incorporation statutes were just beginning to spread across the states 
during this period, the corporate form was not readily available to business organizers at this time, 
and this example includes businesses that operated for profit but may have been sole 
proprietorships or partnerships rather than corporations.  
 161. KYLE G. VOLK, MORAL MINORITIES AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 3, 
37–38 (2014). 
 162. Id.  
 163. Id. at 38. 
 164. Id. at 168. 
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hotelkeepers, and others in the alcohol industry formed grassroots 
political associations that mobilized democratic engagement.165 
Organizers typically invited all interested participants to meetings and 
rallies; according to Professor Volk, “these gatherings . . . pulled 
thousands upon thousands of Americans into public life.”166 Brewers 
and dealers, big and small, came together to lobby for their cause, put 
pressure on politicians, run tickets of their own candidates in elections, 
sway public opinion, and eventually challenge the constitutionality of 
prohibition laws in courts.167 Anti-prohibitionists argued that a 
tyrannical majority of fanatical reformers and state legislatures were 
violating the personal liberty of Americans and had wrongly eradicated 
a form of property—alcohol—and “turn[ed] once law-abiding 
businessmen into criminals.”168 
In New York, one of the hottest battlegrounds, associations of 
liquor dealers raised large amounts of money for a legal defense fund, 
and dealers “committed themselves to civil disobedience—to selling in 
the face of the law.”169 One association circulated detailed instructions 
to its liquor dealer members, explaining how to respond to potential 
enforcement attempts in order to preserve legal causes of action and to 
ensure that public officers were treated respectfully and without 
violence.170 These acts of disobedience were done openly and reported 
nationally in newspapers.171 
The two most notable cases of the era, which both reached the 
New York Court of Appeals, involved liquor dealers who sold alcohol 
in the face of prohibition, accepted arrest peacefully, and relied upon 
the legal defense fund.172 The Court of Appeals ultimately declared 
New York’s liquor prohibition unconstitutional on the basis that it 
 
 165. Id. at 168–77. 
 166. Id. at 174. 
 167. Id. at 185–86. 
 168. Id. at 178–79. 
 169. Id. at 186; see also Kyle G. Volk, What if the Fourth of July Were Dry?, OUP BLOG (July 
4, 2014), https://blog.oup.com/2014/07/alcohol-free-fourth-of-july [https://perma.cc/KHP5-
2DDA] (characterizing liquor businesses as engaging in “civil disobedience” by defiantly selling 
alcohol with the hope of being arrested in order to test the prohibition’s constitutionality in court, 
thus countering prohibitionists “with tactics intended to protect civil liberties and minority rights 
in America’s democracy”). 
 170. VOLK, supra note 161, at 186. 
 171. Id. at 187. 
 172. Id. at 187 (discussing People v. Toynbee, 20 Barb. 168 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1855) and 
Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378 (1856)). 
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denied due process in property.173 Another major victory came when 
the Indiana Supreme Court overturned the state’s prohibition law, 
stating that the legislature had “invaded the constitutional right of the 
citizen.”174 Liquor dealer associations remained in force throughout the 
nineteenth century, and although not always successful, their tactics 
served as a model for various businesses that challenged Sunday laws 
and more generally helped to transform understandings of minority 
rights.175 
On the other side of the coin, some corporate disobedience 
involves corporations claiming their own moral stances against laws. 
Several seminal cases establishing corporate constitutional and 
statutory rights fit this description. 
One recent example involves Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., a closely 
held corporation that operates a nationwide chain of craft stores.176 The 
Hobby Lobby shareholders, the Green family of Oklahoma, are 
Christians who decided to sue the government in their individual 
capacity and on behalf of the corporation rather than comply with the 
Affordable Care Act’s (“ACA”) requirement that employee health-
insurance plans cover contraception.177 Hobby Lobby’s opposition to 
 
 173. Id. 
 174. Beebe v. State, 6 Ind. 501, 519 (1855); see also VOLK, supra note 161, at 188 (discussing 
Beebe). For another excellent discussion of court battles involving prohibition restrictions, see 
WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-
CENTURY AMERICA 177–89 (1996). 
 175. See VOLK, supra note 161, at 190–201, 204–05 (“Liquor dealers and drinkers . . . and the 
era’s other everyday moral minorities . . . transformed minority rights from the comparatively 
narrow concern of propertied aristocrats, slaveholders, and intellectuals into the rallying cry of 
growing groups of socioeconomically diverse Americans.”). Volk further explained the impact 
that businesses had on liquor laws: 
Ultimately, it was [the liquor businesses’] decision to resist that pushed courts to 
occasionally invalidate laws and brought legislatures to repeal laws and replace them 
with new measures. But the challengers I found just as often lost in court and in the 
court of public opinion. When this occurred, their efforts often had the unintended 
effect of strengthening state power as judiciaries and the public validated particular 
exercises of police power. 
Kyle G. Volk, The Consequential State: Public Law and the Release of Energy in Nineteenth-
Century America, 57 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 232, 236 (2017). 
 176. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2764–65 (2014). 
 177. See id. at 2766 (“The Greens, Hobby Lobby, and Mardel sued [the Department of Health 
and Human Services] and other federal agencies and officials to challenge the contraceptive 
mandate under RFRA and the Free Exercise Clause.”). The blockbuster case Citizens United v. 
FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), also involved a corporation (nonprofit) that proactively sought 
declaratory and injunctive relief against the Federal Election Commission; the corporation 
asserted that the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act was unconstitutional as applied to its speech, 
a political film. Id. at 318–22 (2010). 
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the ACA ultimately resulted in the Supreme Court’s ruling that the 
ACA violated the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act as applied 
to the company.178 The Hobby Lobby plaintiffs claimed that complying 
with the ACA would substantially burden their sincerely held religious 
beliefs. Signaling their claimed moral stance against the law, their 
counsel stated: “It is with a heavy heart that anyone needs to go to 
court to sue their own government.”179 Twenty-seven other companies 
filed similar lawsuits against the Department of Health and Human 
Services over the health care law.180 If Hobby Lobby and the Greens 
had not succeeded in their controversial case, the corporation would 
have faced fines of approximately $1.3 million per day or $475 million 
per year for compliance failure.181 
Many examples exist involving nonprofit corporations. Perhaps 
most famously, during the civil rights era the NAACP litigated the 
scope of its members’ rights after being challenged for violating a state 
statute.182 
In 1956, the Alabama attorney general sued the NAACP, a 
nonprofit membership corporation formed in New York, for violating 
a law requiring out-of-state corporations to register before doing 
business in the state.183 The state circuit court issued an order 
restraining the NAACP from engaging in further activities in 
Alabama.184 The NAACP moved to dissolve the restraining order, 
arguing that it was exempt from the registration requirement and that 
 
 178. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759, 2785.  
 179. La’tasha Givens, Hobby Lobby Sues Government Over Contraceptive Coverage, KFOR 
(Sept. 12, 2012), http://kfor.com/2012/09/12/hobby-lobby-sues-government-over-contraceptive 
[https://perma.cc/KPG3-T6AP]. 
 180. Id. For a criticism of Hobby Lobby as “more reminiscent of market libertarianism than 
of religious freedom,” see Elizabeth Sepper, Free Exercise Lochnerism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1453, 
1453 (2015).  
 181. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759. Another recent case involved a small corporation, 
wholly owned by a baker and his wife, that refused to create a cake for a same-sex wedding on 
the basis of the baker’s religious beliefs. The Colorado Civil Rights Commission upheld an 
administrative law judge’s decision that the refusal violated the state’s anti-discrimination law and 
ordered the corporation to take remedial measures and ensure compliance. The Supreme Court 
ultimately invalidated the Commission’s order on the ground that the proceedings lacked 
religious neutrality. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 
1719, 1731 (2018). For an example of a business unsuccessfully claiming constitutional rights, see 
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (challenging the public 
accommodations provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 through a declaratory judgment 
action). 
 182. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 451–53 (1958). 
 183. Id. at 451–52. 
 184. Id. at 452–53. 
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the Fourteenth Amendment right to freedom of speech and assembly 
protected its activity.185 Before the hearing on this motion, the court 
granted the state’s request for a large number of the nonprofit’s records 
and papers, including a membership list.186 The NAACP refused to 
comply, and the court found it in civil contempt and levied a $10,000 
fine.187 Disclosing the NAACP’s membership list would have 
potentially subjected its members to persecution and personal harm.188 
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court found in favor of the NAACP, 
striking down the judgment of civil contempt and concluding that its 
members’ rights of association had been violated.189 In commentary 
several years later, the New York Times put into context the state court 
proceedings that the NAACP had faced: “The history of this case 
shows nothing less than a cynical perversion of the legal process by 
state judges sworn to uphold law and the Constitution.”190 
The “sanctuary” movement of current times echoes the past and 
presents new issues of potential disobedience in the context of 
immigration law and policy. Nonprofit and municipal corporations, 
including universities, churches, and cities, have declared themselves 
sanctuaries and “openly refuse to cooperate with federal requests to 
hold undocumented immigrants until they can be deported.”191 If the 
government were to cut off funds to corporations that provide 
sanctuary and refuse cooperation, it “would invite court fights that 
could take many months, or even years, to settle.”192 Some legal 
scholars have pointed to the possibility of business corporations joining 
the sanctuary movement and claiming religious beliefs that morally 
compel them to shelter immigrant employees and their families.193 
 
 185. Id. at 453. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. See id. (“The Association both urges that it is constitutionally entitled to resist official 
inquiry into its membership lists, and that it may assert, on behalf of its members, a right personal 
to them to be protected . . . .”). 
 189. Id. at 466. 
 190. N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 1964), http://www.nytimes.com/1964/06/06/
naacp-v-alabama.html [https://perma.cc/VPF6-7BA2].  
 191. Clyde Haberman, Trump and the Battle Over Sanctuary in America, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/05/us/sanctuary-cities-movement-1980s-political-
asylum.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/LD3M-DK5W]. 
 192. Id. 
 193. See Elizabeth Brown & Inara Scott, Sanctuary Corporations: Should Liberal 
Corporations Get Religion?, 20 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1101, 1104 (2018).  
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4. General Business Lobbying.  There is another common context 
in which corporate disobedience arises as part of an effort to change or 
clarify the law—general business operations and lobbying. Companies 
that violate the law while trying to change it are not necessarily 
engaged in technological innovation. Some companies are simply too 
impatient to pause their business activity while engaging in efforts to 
change existing laws. 
Kellogg Company, for example, flaunted regulations that it 
pushed to change for marketing purposes. In 1984, Kellogg put on the 
packaging of its All-Bran cereal a statement of the National Cancer 
Institute’s finding of a correlation between high-fiber diets and lower 
risks of certain types of cancer.194 At the time, advertising or labeling a 
food product with health claims that linked the food to the prevention, 
treatment, or cure of a specific disease brought the product within the 
drug regulation purview of the Food and Drug Administration 
(“FDA”).195 Given that Kellogg had not put its All-Bran cereal through 
the more burdensome process governing products classified as drugs, 
Kellogg’s decision to add this label to its All-Bran risked having the 
product pulled from the market.196 For several years, Kellogg 
continued to make health claims for various products such as All-Bran 
and Nutrific cereals while petitioning the FDA to change its 
regulations.197 
In 1992, after several reversals of its position, the FDA ceded to 
Kellogg’s request and allowed for scientifically substantiated health 
claims on food labels.198 While some have expressed concerns about the 
potential for consumers to be misled, other commentators have 
pointed out that Kellogg served the consumer interest by pushing to 
share information about food products at the point of purchase on the 
supermarket shelves, where consumers make their buying decisions.199 
*   *   * 
From a cereal manufacturer defying labeling rules to the 
contemporary issue of “legal” marijuana businesses, corporations 
 
 194. Dennis et al., supra note 106, at 17.  
 195. Id. at 16. 
 196. Id. at 16–17. 
 197. Id. at 17. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. 
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operate in violation of the law for a variety of reasons and in 
circumstances that might evoke scrutiny on different bases. In some 
instances, corporations defy legal mandates but engage in litigation 
that clarifies the law, or ultimately collaborate with regulators at a later 
time. Sometimes corporations are engaged in lobbying efforts with 
agencies or legislatures that could change the law that they are 
subverting or transgressing. Some of the above examples might strike 
some readers as disobedient, while others might say the corporation 
simply pursued legal recourse within its right.200 These cases raise deep 
questions about what it means for a corporation to intend to violate the 
law and whether ultimate vindication or cooperation transforms or 
justifies otherwise disobedient activity. Corporate law and literature 
has assumed that the question of whether a corporation intends to 
violate the law or is engaged in lawful conduct is clear. But in many 
instances it is not. 
Furthermore, although specific examples may spark legitimate 
concern and debate about countervailing social costs and the 
questionable ability of corporations to assert moral claims, on the 
whole, some of this activity has the potential to provide value. 
Corporate disobedience has been an important engine for 
transforming various areas of law. The next Part begins to uncover 
some of the implications. 
III.  IMPLICATIONS FOR CORPORATE LAW AND BEYOND 
Understanding the full spectrum of corporate disobedience not 
only reveals the role that some of this activity can play in innovation 
and legal change, it also sheds new light on corporate law’s role in 
constraining unlawful activity. This Part examines those insights and 
implications. It begins by reexamining the statutory requirement of 
lawful conduct and then turns to showing how fiduciary duties are an 
ineffective tool for serving society’s interests regarding corporate 
disobedience. The final subsection explores several features of 
corporate disobedience that might bear on its assessment. 
 
 
 
 200. Cf. Bulman-Pozen & Pozen, supra note 25, at 841 (“[C]ivil disobedience does not lose its 
status as such solely because the behavior is ultimately deemed lawful. The critical question is 
whether, at the time the act is taken . . . , those responsible for the act genuinely and reasonably 
believe it accords with all positive law.”). 
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A. The Corporate Statute Is Expressive and Embeds Society’s 
Interests 
Statutory dictates stating that corporations can be chartered only 
for lawful business serve an expressive function.201 Such provisions 
assert the authority of the state in granting the privilege of operating 
through the corporate form and set a limit on the privileges that flow 
from corporate status. Corporate statutes allow people to conduct their 
activity through a separate entity but do not immunize actors from the 
basic obligation to obey the law. And, although statutes refer 
specifically to the purposes for which a state will allow chartering, 
courts and scholars have broadly interpreted the statutes to impose a 
general requirement of lawful conduct in corporate operations.202 
A new insight on this topic also follows from observing the full 
spectrum of corporate disobedience. The statutory dictate serves not 
only this expressive function, but it also, quite notably, embeds 
society’s interests into corporate law and conveys the principle that 
corporations should pursue legal change through established and 
lawful democratic processes. Put differently, the corporate statute can 
be read as favoring an approach that pushes corporations to use 
officially sanctioned channels for challenging and dissenting from the 
law. 
For example, to the extent that the “essential bottom-line 
requirement”203 of lawful conduct goes beyond chartered purposes to 
cover all corporate activity, it conceivably also implies a preference 
that corporations challenge a law proactively through established 
means, such as in an action for declaratory judgment or through the 
legislative process.204 The statute implies that if there is a question as to 
whether certain conduct is lawful, corporations should ask permission 
first; the statute does not authorize violating the law and then waiting 
 
 201. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101(b) (2016). For a discussion of law’s essential role 
to communicate moral principles and joint commitments, see Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Tanner 
Lecture on Human Values at UC Berkeley: Speaking Amongst Ourselves: Democracy and Law 
(Apr. 29, 2017), http://tannerlectures.berkeley.edu/2016-2017-lecture-series [https://perma.cc/
DCR2-NPLY].  
 202. See supra Part I.A.  
 203. Strine, Jr. et al., supra note 29, at 649. 
 204. Id. 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
§ 2.01, cmt. g (AM. LAW INST. 1994) suggests a similar view, stating: “The norm of obedience to 
law also is usually deemed counterbalanced where, under appropriate conditions, a rule is 
violated openly for the purpose of testing its validity or interpretation.”  
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to see if the corporation will be held accountable or breaking the law 
while concurrently lobbying for change.205 
In addition, although some commentators prefer focusing on a 
cost-benefit approach to lawbreaking rather than the statutory 
dictate,206 their argument is not significantly strengthened by an 
understanding of the spectrum of corporate disobedience presented in 
this Article. Some corporate lawbreaking may have redeeming virtues, 
such as creating positive externalities for others or helping to reshape 
laws, which can grow stale or fall out of step with modern times. 
Corporations can sometimes serve a useful role in finding 
entrepreneurial opportunities.207 However, the fact that the benefits of 
lawbreaking may indeed transcend one corporation’s gain arguably 
only underscores how difficult it would be for a corporation to engage 
in an accurate cost-benefit analysis that captures all the societal 
interests embedded in the statutory requirement of lawful conduct.208 
B. Fiduciary Duties Are a Poor Fit for Constraining Corporate 
Disobedience 
The observations regarding corporate disobedience not only put 
the statutory dictate incorporating society’s interests in a new light, 
they also illuminate that fiduciary duties are an ineffective tool for 
constraining this activity. Furthermore, policing corporate 
 
 205. Corporations may in some instances face obstacles to obtaining declaratory relief or 
challenging a regulator’s decision through appropriate legal channels because of procedural 
requirements such as standing and ripeness. See, e.g., Adult Video Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
71 F.3d 563, 565 (6th Cir. 1995) (ruling that a trade association lacked standing to pursue its claim 
for a declaratory judgment that a particular film was not obscene because the association had not 
alleged a sufficient injury or threat of injury). 
 206. See supra Part I.B. 
 207. See, e.g., Pollman & Barry, supra note 10, at 437–42 (discussing potential benefits of 
regulatory entrepreneurship); D. Gordon Smith & Darian M. Ibrahim, Law and Entrepreneurial 
Opportunities, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1533, 1540–49 (2013) (discussing definitions of 
entrepreneurial opportunities and the source of such opportunities). For a classic work that 
describes entrepreneurial action as the disruptive force that sustains economic growth in a 
capitalist system, even as it threatens to undermine institutions, see generally JOSEPH A. 
SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY (1942).  
 208. See THOMAS O. MCGARITY, FREEDOM TO HARM 9 (2013) (arguing that the “ever-
changing outcome” of the “social bargain” between the business community and society is already 
reflected in “the web of legislation, regulations, and common law rules that govern the 
marketplace”); Ryan, supra note 50, at 491 (“[W]hile a corporate manager might be able to 
identify opportunities for profitable deviance, there is no guarantee that overall social utility will 
be enhanced by the proscribed conduct.”); see also Coffee, supra note 85, at 794 n.11 (1984) 
(arguing that “the legislature cannot know how high to set penalty levels in order to make the 
expected penalty cost exceed the expected benefit”). 
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disobedience through fiduciary duties may even lead to inequitable 
results in some circumstances. 
To start, the structure of corporate law creates an obligation with 
an imperfect accountability mechanism: the fundamental corporate 
law tenet requiring lawful conduct is intended to serve the public 
interest, but fiduciary duties are enforceable only by shareholders.209 In 
a famous article published in the Harvard Law Review in 1931, Adolf 
Berle, one of the foundational thinkers of modern corporate law, 
argued that fiduciary duties would help to police the broad powers that 
corporate managers enjoy under corporate law.210 According to Berle, 
“through the very nature of the corporate entity, responsibility goes 
with power,” and accountability comes from requiring power to be “at 
all times exercisable only for the ratable benefit of all the shareholders 
as their interest appears.”211 Thus, “corporate action must be twice 
tested: first, by the technical rules having to do with the existence and 
proper exercise of the power; second, by equitable rules somewhat 
analogous to those which apply . . . to the trustee’s exercise of wide 
powers [as] a fiduciary.”212 Notably, even Berle separated the 
“technical rules” regarding proper exercise of corporate power from 
the equitable rules embodied in fiduciary duty doctrine. They are of a 
different type and aimed at different goals. 
Courts have valiantly, but imperfectly, fit together these pieces by 
ascribing to shareholders an interest in having corporate fiduciaries 
obey the law. The Delaware Supreme Court explained it needed a 
“doctrinal vehicle” to proscribe culpable conduct;213 however, it had 
few tools at its disposal and once it contemplated the issue from within 
 
 209. The standard view of fiduciary duty litigation is that it serves “as a gap-filler to protect 
the interests of stockholders.” Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Fiduciary Principles 
And Delaware Corporation Law: Searching For The Optimal Balance By Understanding That The 
World Is Not, OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW (forthcoming) (manuscript at 9), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3044477 [https://perma.cc/AJ5A-JPDK]; see also Leo E. Strine, Jr., 
Corporate Power Is Corporate Purpose II: An Encouragement for Future Consideration from 
Professors Johnson and Millon, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1165, 1173 (2017) (footnotes omitted) 
(“[T]he Delaware General Corporation Law gives only stockholders rights, such as the right to 
elect directors, vote on major transactions, and enforce fiduciary duties.”).  
 210. A.A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1049–50 
(1931). 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. at 1049. 
 213. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 66 (Del. 2006). 
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the context of shareholder derivative litigation, it ineluctably became a 
matter of categorizing a fiduciary duty.214 
Scholars and jurists have attempted similar justifications. For 
example, Professors Claire Hill and Brett McDonnell argue that 
conduct involving illegality raises an issue concerning the fiduciary 
duty of good faith, and is treated with less legal deference, because it 
may be contrary to shareholders’ interests as citizens.215 Similarly, 
Chief Justice Strine, together with co-authors, has explained that good 
faith defines “the state of mind that must motivate a loyal fiduciary,” 
which is typically described as a belief that one’s actions “are in the 
best interests of the corporation and its stockholders.”216 In this view, 
good faith is best understood as intertwined with or subsumed under 
the duty of loyalty because “a director cannot act loyally if she uses her 
corporate powers in bad faith to pursue improper ends.”217 Further, 
“[w]hen directors knowingly cause the corporation to . . . engage in 
unlawful acts . . . they are disloyal to the corporation’s essential nature. 
By causing the corporation to become a lawless rogue, they make the 
corporation untrue to itself and to the promise underlying its own 
societally authorized birth.”218 
Other scholars have commented on the awkward fit of this 
analytical approach and have advocated for understanding the duty of 
good faith as an independent duty or have championed a separate duty 
of obedience. Professor Melvin Eisenberg argues for a separate, gap-
filling duty of good faith because “corporate managers have an 
obligation not to knowingly cause the corporation to violate the 
law  . . . [that] cannot be rationalized under either the duty of care or 
the duty of loyalty.”219 In his view: 
 
 214. The other corporate law mechanism that has been used in the past is the ultra vires 
doctrine. Despite calls to reinvigorate the doctrine, it remains rarely used and is largely perceived 
as a historic relic. See Greenfield, supra note 28, at 1280–81 (acknowledging perceptions that the 
ultra vires doctrine is “dead” and calling for a revival of the doctrine). 
 215. Hill & McDonnell, supra note 30, at 1784–85 (2007) (“Shareholders are also citizens, and 
insofar as laws advance the general social welfare, citizens care about that. A diversified 
shareholder with small stakes in any one corporation may well find that the public interest 
predominates over the corporate interest.”). 
 216. Strine, Jr. et al., supra note 29, at 633. 
 217. Id. at 643; see also id. at 652 (“It is only by creating the artificial idea that a director may 
be loyal to the corporation by causing it to pursue profit through unlawful activity that there is 
any need to use good faith as a gap-filler.”). 
 218. Id. at 650. 
 219. Eisenberg, supra note 29, at 11. 
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Why, and to whom, is a director or officer being disloyal if he causes 
the corporation to take an action that violates the law, when he is not 
self-interested in the action and the action is rationally calculated to 
increase corporate profit and shareholder gain? Trying to squeeze 
such conduct in the duty of loyalty is like trying to squeeze the foot of 
Cinderella’s stepsister into Cinderella’s glass slipper—an enterprise 
equally painful and fruitless.220 
Likewise, Professor Alan Palmiter argues that corporate law should 
revive a “duty of obedience” to recognize that “the duties of care and 
loyalty are incomplete” and that “[c]orporate actions that violate legal 
norms, even when those actions are diligent and selfless, are 
inconsistent with fundamental expectations of corporate conduct.”221 
Each of these arguments recognizes that the statutory requirement of 
lawful conduct is unlike the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty, which 
directly serve the shareholders’ interests. Yet, both scholars still strive 
to preserve fiduciary duty as a means of achieving the goal of lawful 
conduct. 
An important point that these criticisms do not highlight is that 
the fiduciary duty of good faith does not inquire into the potential 
social harm or value of specific acts of corporate disobedience. The 
duty requires fidelity to the law without evaluation of situations in 
which this may be of more or less importance to the public interest. To 
the extent that social harm is the relevant concern, the argument for 
cabining the duty of good faith, and its obligation to obey the law, 
within the duty of loyalty should be particularly controversial in 
situations in which corporate disobedience is rooted in innovation or 
changing social norms. 
Furthermore, to the extent that existing case law suggests that a 
knowing violation of law is an automatic breach of the duty of 
loyalty,222 it may lead to unfair results in some circumstances. Such a 
 
 220. Id. at 38; see also Bainbridge et al., supra note 29, at 594, 604 (highlighting other issues 
raised by the good faith doctrine such as whether a de minimis exception should be recognized 
and how to craft appropriate remedies when there are no ill-gotten gains for the fiduciary to 
disgorge). 
 221. Palmiter, supra note 43, at 458; id. at 460 (“The duty of obedience served mostly as a 
natural corollary to the ultra vires doctrine. Just as the corporation was prevented from acting 
beyond its powers, corporate actors were obligated not to perpetrate such actions—and could be 
held liable if they did.”). 
 222. Bainbridge et al., supra note 29, at 604 (“As for the concept of good faith, the extent to 
which it exposes directors to new sources of liability remains unresolved. Because categorizing 
conduct as bad faith seemingly results in per se liability, unconstrained by questions of causation, 
which is nonexculpable under section 102(b)(7), this uncertainty is quite troubling.”). 
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policy of automatic breach could usefully give directors and officers a 
basis to refuse to engage in disobedience and it could deter some 
misconduct, but it is also concerning to the extent that it functionally 
provides shareholders with an insurance policy. Shareholders would 
gain from corporate disobedience when the law goes unenforced or is 
changed in the corporation’s favor and leads to corporate profit, and 
yet shareholders could sue directors and officers for breach of fiduciary 
duty when it turns out that breaking the law did not pay off for the 
corporation.223 
A recent case in the Delaware Court of Chancery provides an 
example. In Kandell v. Niv,224 the court excused demand and allowed a 
derivative complaint to proceed where the plaintiff-shareholder 
alleged that the directors pursued a business model premised on 
violating a federal regulation.225 The corporation, a foreign-exchange 
broker, publicly disclosed its business practice of limiting clients’ 
trading losses, which the plaintiff recognized “increase[ed] profits” but 
contravened a rule promulgated by the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission and eventually led to large corporate losses when a “flash 
crash” unexpectedly occurred.226 To be sure, the state does not “charter 
lawbreakers,” as the court explained,227 but it nonetheless seems odd 
to countenance an internal settling up in favor of the corporation and 
its shareholders when the directors’ attempts to benefit them fail.228 
 
 223. One scholar has raised this concern in the context of the “legalized” marijuana industry. 
See Scheuer, supra note 22, at 543 (arguing for an exception for the marijuana industry that would 
make violation of the Controlled Substances Act not a violation of the law for purposes of state 
corporate law: “It would seem ridiculous to allow an equity holder to sue their manager for 
violating the law when the equity holder invested for that very purpose.”). 
 224. Kandell v. Niv, C.A. No. 11812-VCG, 2017 WL 4334149 (Del. Ch. Sept. 29, 2017).  
 225. Id. at *5, *18 (“I pause to emphasize that this case presents a highly unusual set of facts: 
a Delaware corporation with a business model allegedly reliant on a clear violation of a federal 
regulation; a situation of which I can reasonably infer the Board was aware.”). 
 226. Id. at *1. 
 227. Id. at *16. 
 228. See Palmiter, supra note 43, at 476 (“Just as individuals . . . have (or should have) the 
freedom to make cost-benefit choices on whether to comply with legal norms, the corporation 
should also have some latitude. Thus, while noncompliance might result in penalties against the 
corporation . . . such an outcome should not necessarily demand an internal corporate settling 
up.”); Ryan, supra note 50, at 424 (noting the potential windfall for plaintiffs’ attorneys); Stephen 
Bainbridge, Does an Intentional Violation of Law = Bad Faith?, PROFESSOR BAINBRIDGE (June 
8, 2006), http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2006/06/does-an-
intentional-violation-of-law-bad-faith.html [https://perma.cc/7X5G-D2HC] (“Allowing 
shareholders to sue over a decision made with the intent of maximizing corporate profits is 
nothing less than double-dipping, even if the decision proves misguided.”).  
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Moreover, it is worth observing just how poor a fit fiduciary duties 
are for policing corporate disobedience. Corporate directors and 
officers owe fiduciary duties to “the corporation and its 
shareholders”229—not to the government or society writ large. In the 
development of corporate law, legislative drafters and courts have 
unsurprisingly supported basic principles of public policy and 
commonly accepted notions of general welfare by limiting corporations 
to lawful conduct. But this does not mean that fiduciary duties are an 
effective mechanism for achieving those goals; rather, the fiduciary 
duty of good faith was simply the corporate governance tool that was 
readily available.230 As examples in Part II illustrate, corporate 
disobedience may violate the law, but that does not necessarily mean 
it hurts the corporation’s shareholders or even its stakeholders, and it 
is possible that in some instances the disobedient activity could provide 
some other social benefit. 
And, quite predictably, shareholders are imperfect enforcers of 
society’s interests through the fiduciary duty of good faith.231 As Chief 
Justice Strine has explained: “Under America’s leading corporation 
law, only one constituency can sue to enforce the legal duties owed by 
directors and managers . . . . These powers translate into purpose 
because those who run corporations owe their continued employment 
. . . to the only constituency the corporate law establishes—
 
 229. See, e.g., Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1280 (Del. 
1988) (holding that under well-established Delaware law, “directors owe fiduciary duties of care 
and loyalty to the corporation and its shareholders” (citing Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes 
Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 179 (Del. 1986))); see also Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 709 
(2009) (“[T]he fiduciary duties of officers are the same as those of directors.”). 
 230. Another potential tool, “the corporate death penalty,” is the rarely used power of the 
state attorney general to revoke a corporate charter or to enjoin a corporation from the 
transaction of unauthorized business. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 124(3) (2016) (providing that 
a corporate “lack of capacity or power may be asserted: . . . (3) In a proceeding by the Attorney 
General to dissolve the corporation, or to enjoin the corporation from the transaction of 
unauthorized business”); Greenfield, supra note 28, at 1359–60 (“It will not be in the state’s 
interest to use this remedy very often.”). 
 231. Scholars have similarly observed that corporate compliance regimes originate from the 
government rather than from an internal corporate constituency such as shareholders. See 
Griffith, supra note 101, at 2078–79 (“The impetus for compliance does not come from a 
traditional corporate constituency . . . [but] from the government . . . . The contemporary 
compliance function subverts the notion that corporate governance arrangements both are and 
ought to be the product of a bargain between shareholders and managers.”); Hechler Baer, supra 
note 101, at 954–55 (challenging “the notion that corporate compliance regulation is an example 
of [collaborative] New Governance” and showing “[t]o the contrary, it is at best an illusory 
delegation of responsibility whereby the government commands firms ex ante to implement 
‘effective’ compliance programs”).  
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stockholders.”232 Despite widespread corporate illegality, there are few 
modern cases in which shareholders have successfully held directors 
liable for breaking the law.233 In addition to the fact that violating the 
law may benefit rather than harm the corporation and its shareholders, 
it may be difficult for shareholders to monitor corporate 
disobedience.234 A suit for breach of fiduciary duty entails the usual 
obstacles of shareholder derivative litigation, such as showing demand 
futility and potentially facing a motion to dismiss from a special 
litigation committee.235 The difficulty of proving an intentional 
violation of law might also discourage plaintiffs’ attorneys from 
bringing cases on behalf of shareholders. In many instances, intent and 
the illegality of the corporation’s actions might be contestable. 
One final observation regarding fiduciary duties: The rarity of 
shareholder enforcement of the requirement of lawful conduct raises 
concerns, yet it has the interesting effect of leaving play in the joints for 
the kinds of corporate disobedience this Article examines. This opens 
the door for corporate misconduct that causes social harm, but it also 
presents entrepreneurial opportunities, gives businesses latitude to 
assert rights in opposition to law, and provides flexibility for society to 
 
 232. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Corporate Power Is Corporate Purpose I: Evidence from My 
Hometown, 33 OXFORD REV. OF ECON. POL’Y 176, 178–79 (2017); id. at 178 (“As with the 
constitution of a human polity, the core insight into who is to be served as an end can be found 
within the terms of authorizing corporate statute itself and who it empowers and who it does 
not.”); see also Strine, Jr., supra note 209, at 1177 (“The boards of these corporations did not view 
themselves as having any national loyalties or loyalties to other constituencies, they viewed 
themselves as elected officials in the republic of equity capital.”).  
 233. Beveridge, supra note 60, at 732 (“[T]here is no such thing as a corporation . . . in 
compliance with law; rather, there are only corporations (and businesses) out of compliance with 
law to varying degrees. Despite that fact, there are no modern cases holding directors liable to 
shareholders for breaking the law.”); see also GREENFIELD, supra note 83, at 75 (“[T]here is not 
a single, modern case that holds directors liable to shareholders just because the directors or the 
corporation broke the law.”); John C. Coffee, Jr., Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a 
Theoretical View of Corporate Misconduct and an Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REV. 1099, 
1174 (1977) (noting “[t]he absence of a modern case holding defendants strictly liable for 
intentional illegality”); Palmiter, supra note 43, at 460 (“More significantly, no Delaware court 
(the font of modern corporate law) has ever invoked a ‘duty of obedience’ in the for-profit 
corporation.”).  
 234. See DAVID A. WESTBROOK, BETWEEN CITIZEN AND STATE: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
THE CORPORATION 63 (2007) (“As passive and distant owners of the corporation, shareholders 
have little ability to monitor how their business is being conducted . . . . [They] have little 
opportunity to learn of mismanagement . . . .”). 
 235. See RALPH C. FERRARA, SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE LITIGATION: BESIEGING THE 
BOARD §§ 4.01, 5.01, 7.01 (2017); see also WESTBROOK, supra note 234, at 88 (“Doctrines that 
initially appear to provide stout protection of shareholder interests are usually something less.”). 
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absorb transformative cycles of creative destruction.236 The upshot is 
that internal corporate governance cannot be counted on to control 
corporate disobedience, and other areas of law and other enforcers are 
left to respond. 
C. Considerations for Evaluating Corporate Disobedience 
Because corporate law itself does not serve as an effective 
constraint on corporate lawbreaking, regulators, legislators, 
enforcement officials, and jurists are regularly called upon to make 
decisions about corporations engaging in forms of disobedience. This 
final section thus aims to highlight several features of corporate 
disobedience that might bear on its normative assessment. Existing 
literature on the cost-benefit approach to lawbreaking distinguishes 
between criminal and civil law, and fiduciary duty doctrine 
distinguishes between intentional and unintentional violations of 
law.237 Bringing together the full range of corporate disobedience helps 
reveal and frame additional relevant considerations for future 
debate.238 
1. Proactive vs. reactive.  The first consideration is whether a 
corporation is proactively seeking clarification or change in the law, or 
is instead simply responding to enforcement action. As discussed in 
Part III.A, corporate law itself requires lawful conduct, which 
implicitly expresses a preference that corporations use established and 
lawful democratic processes to challenge the law. Even if a corporation 
were to express disdain for the law or state a refusal to comply, if it 
were to first proactively seek clarification through a declaratory 
judgment, advisory opinion, or other guidance without incurring a legal 
violation, such an action would be consistent with its state-granted 
corporate charter. 
 
 236. See Walter Isaacson, How Uber and Airbnb Became Poster Children for the Disruption 
Economy, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/19/books/review/wild-
ride-adam-lashinsky-uber-airbnb.html [https://perma.cc/Y85Q-DKLW] (“[S]ocieties must find 
ways to absorb these economic transformations, because it is futile to resist them. Peer-to-peer 
technology [is] disruptive . . . . But it has an inexorable tendency to . . . reinforc[e] the most basic 
rule of entrepreneurship . . . to make something that people really want.”). 
 237. See supra Part I. 
 238. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 319–20 (2d ed. 1999) (“Precise principles that 
straightaway decide actual cases are clearly out of the question.”). 
POLLMAN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/13/2018  11:00 AM 
758  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 68:709 
Corporations are legal persons under the law and have the right 
to sue and be sued.239 They may, for example, file suit for a declaratory 
judgment to receive a ruling on whether a planned course of action 
would be lawful.240 In addition, corporations may lawfully pursue 
legislative change at the local, state, or federal level.241 Of course, 
political spending and the lobbying process, particularly with regard to 
corporations, raise a host of concerns such as rent-seeking and 
regulatory capture, and are subject to regulation.242 The point here is 
simply to contrast situations in which corporations pursue legal change 
within the bounds of the law with situations in which corporations are 
caught acting in violation of the law. For some companies, lawfully 
pursuing legal change is too slow for their desires or needs, and other 
companies may plainly be lawbreakers that are only hoping to evade 
the law rather than to clarify or change it; either of these scenarios may 
indicate that the activity is socially harmful.243 
2. Open vs. secret.  Another consideration is whether the 
corporation is openly or clandestinely violating a law. Corporations by 
their nature may be incapable of engaging in true civil disobedience, 
 
 239. 19 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 1850 (2017) (“The power of a corporation to sue is a 
necessary incident to its creation, existence, protection, and to the enforcement of its legitimate 
rights and the redress of wrongs suffered by it . . . . The right of a corporation to sue is both 
constitutionally and statutorily mandated.”). 
 240. One example is Hobby Lobby’s suit for a declaratory judgment regarding the 
applicability of the Affordable Care Act’s contraception requirement. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 
Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2764–65 (2014). This does not suggest that Hobby Lobby’s arguments 
on the merits of its claims were correct, but the means by which it pursued clarification or legal 
change is illustrative.  
 241. See Williams, supra note 82, at 1338 (“In a democracy, if the corporation disagrees with 
the legislature, there are ways to seek to change that determination short of economic 
vigilantism.”). 
 242. See generally PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE 
AND HOW TO LIMIT IT (Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss, eds. 2013) (discussing regulatory 
capture); Hasen, supra note 91, at 191 (discussing lobbying regulations and rent-seeking); Pollman 
& Barry, supra note 10, at 442–47 (discussing concerns about regulatory entrepreneurship); 
George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971) 
(identifying and theorizing regulatory capture). 
 243. Corporations are not generally considered to lack the political power to challenge 
undesirable legislation, and in fact the more common concern is that corporations wield too much 
political influence. See Ganesh Sitaraman, The Puzzling Absence of Economic Power in 
Constitutional Theory, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 1445, 1447–49 (2016) (discussing the “popular 
sentiment that ‘the system is rigged’ to work for wealthy and corporate interests” (quoting 
Elizabeth Warren, Speech to the Democratic National Convention (Sept. 5, 2012), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/05/elizabeth-warren-speech-text_n_1850597.html [https:// 
perma.cc/QM97-SMXX])). See generally Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Political Powerlessness, 90 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1527 (2015) (discussing the powerlessness doctrine and group power). 
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but the concept nonetheless reflects that an open violation can hold 
special meaning in our society. Notwithstanding a great variety of 
definitions, a key element of nearly all characterizations of civil 
disobedience is the openness of the violation—whether it is meant to 
make a public statement.244 
For corporations, some open or easily discoverable violations of 
the law may be nothing more than egregious lawbreaking serving no 
purpose other than strategic advantage,245 but sometimes the 
distinction between open and covert action is probative of whether the 
activity aims for innovation or change. Examples of open violations 
include businesses that are taking advantage of state legalizations of 
marijuana while it remains illegal under federal law—and the 
nineteenth century anti-prohibitionist liquor dealers, brewers, and 
hotelkeepers that openly violated the law and organized in associations 
to preserve their legal claims and push for change.246 
Open violations have informational value. For example, when 
multiple actors openly violate the same law, or when a company 
engaged in an open violation receives significant public support, it 
suggests that the law at issue may deserve reexamination because it has 
fallen out of step with the times in terms of technology or social 
practice. The law or regulation may be prohibitively expensive or 
 
 244. See RAWLS, supra note 238, at 320 (defining civil disobedience “as a public, nonviolent, 
conscientious yet political act contrary in the law or policies of the government”); Hugo A. Bedau, 
On Civil Disobedience, 58 J. PHIL. 653, 661 (1961) (“Anyone commits an act of civil disobedience 
if and only if he acts illegally, publicly, nonviolently, and conscientiously with the intent to 
frustrate (one of) the laws, policies, or decisions of his government.”); Bulman-Pozen & Pozen, 
supra note 25, at 810–11 (“On most accounts, civil disobedience consists of an open violation of 
law and a willingness to submit to punishment.”); Markovits, supra note 25, at 1898 n.2 (discussing 
civil disobedience as “disobedience guided by political principles and addressed to the public 
generally”); cf. THOREAU, supra note 36 (“If the injustice . . . is of such a nature that it requires 
you to be the agent of injustice to another, then, I say, break the law.”). Philosophers have 
discussed justifications for acts of private conscience under other terms, such as conscientious 
evasion or refusal. See RAWLS, supra note 238, at 323–26; Ostas, supra note 27, at 294.  
 245. For example, in Kandell v. Niv, discussed supra notes 225–28, the brokerage 
corporation’s advertised policy to limit client foreign-exchange losses clearly violated a federal 
prohibition and attracted an enforcement action from the CFTC. Kandell v. Niv, C.A. No. 11812-
VCG, 2017 WL 4334149, at *4 (Del. Ch. Sept. 29, 2017). The company was not pursuing a change 
to this law or claiming moral opposition; it was seemingly operating with the hope of avoiding 
detection or enforcement, despite the brazenness of the violation. 
 246. See supra Part II.B. By contrast, Uber’s covert use of “Greyball,” a software tool it 
developed to evade sting operations by law enforcement, belied the company’s claims that it was 
a technology company to which taxi and employee regulations did not apply. See Mike Isaac, How 
Uber Deceives the Authorities Worldwide, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/03/03/technology/uber-greyball-program-evade-authorities.html?_r=1 [https://perma.cc/
FS3M-6XJR] (discussing Uber’s use of Greyball). 
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complex for businesses to comply with and the actual costs may not 
have been fully understood by lawmakers at the time it was enacted. 
Regulators and lawmakers might glean a variety of other useful 
information from openly communicated corporate disobedience.247 
Operating in the light instead of hiding in the shadows, especially while 
acting in concert with political and social movements, suggests a 
potential willingness to accept consequences and test the possibility of 
legal change. 
To be sure, corporations cannot, however, submit to punishment 
in the same way that individuals can and thus an open violation does 
not justify or transform the conduct into legal activity or civil 
disobedience.248 Corporations cannot be imprisoned. As the British 
Lord Chancellor Edward Thurlow famously remarked in the 
eighteenth century, corporations have no “conscience, . . . no soul to be 
damned, and no body to be kicked.”249 What corporations can do is face 
prosecution for the actions of their agents and accept resulting 
penalties, including fines, revocation of business licenses, and even 
forced dissolution.250 The individuals involved in wrongdoing on behalf 
of the corporation may or may not feel the impact of any such 
consequences.251 Thus, corporate consequences are not necessarily 
meaningless to those involved, but they are of a different scope and 
nature. This difference suggests that direct parallels that scholars and 
commentators have drawn to civil disobedience are largely inapt, and 
there are significant limits to according value to the openness of 
violations.252 In addition, to the extent that open violations are 
 
 247. See Beveridge, supra note 60, at 777 (“The United States is a nation with a 
superabundance of laws: laws that have been forgotten, laws that are rarely or selectively 
enforced, laws that no one understands, and laws that are regarded by everyone as more of a 
nuisance than a moral command.”). 
 248. See THOREAU, supra note 36 (“Under a government which imprisons any unjustly, the 
true place for a just man is also a prison.”); see also RAWLS, supra note 238, at 366–67 (“[F]idelity 
to law is expressed . . . by the willingness to accept the legal consequences of one’s conduct.”). 
 249. John C. Coffee, “No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick”: An Unscandalized Inquiry into 
the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 386 (1981). 
 250. GARRETT, supra note 100, at 4. 
 251. See, e.g., Theodore L. Banks & Christian E. Liipfert, General Principles Behind A 
Compliance Program: The Case for Compliance § 1.03, in CORPORATE LEGAL COMPLIANCE 
HANDBOOK (Theodore L. Banks & Frederick Z. Banks eds., 2d ed. Supp. II 2018) (discussing the 
duties and potential liability of directors, officers, and employees); Samuel W. Buell, Is the White 
Collar Offender Privileged?, 63 DUKE L.J. 823, 824–33 (2014) (examining the treatment of 
individuals who commit crime within the corporate domain). 
 252. See generally Ostas, supra note 27, at 312 (“Businesspeople do not abandon their 
conscience simply because they are in a business setting. If the choice to intentionally violate a 
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numerous or become commonplace, concerns may arise about social 
costs, attitudes toward compliance, and erosion of the rule of law.253 
3. For-profit vs. nonprofit.  For some observers, the for-profit 
nature of business corporations may be the most significant 
consideration in evaluating disobedience. The concern is two-fold 
about motives and the lack of conscience. 
Many scholars have espoused the view that self-interest in profit-
making nullifies other justifications for illegal activity. For example, 
Professor Daniel Markovits has argued that because political 
disobedience can be democracy enhancing, legal violations that occur 
as part of political disobedience can be justifiable.254 However, he 
defines such activity as part of political protest, “not guided by greed 
or self-dealing but by principle.”255 Similarly, Professor Cynthia 
Williams distinguishes the motivation for civil disobedience from “a 
calculation of private economic benefits to a particular corporation, the 
purpose of which is self-interested profit-making.”256 And moral and 
political philosopher John Rawls noted, “it goes without saying that 
civil disobedience cannot be grounded solely on group or self-
interest.”257 According to these views, the profit motive is inconsistent 
with a righteous approach, whether justified by reference to 
democracy, justice, or some other value. 
Along similar lines, for-profit corporations do not have a 
conscience and thus are not constrained by a moral sense, nor are they 
 
business regulation is truly a matter of moral principle rather than convenience, like all forms of 
civil disobedience, it is to be applauded, not condemned.”). Controversial author and fellow at 
the American Enterprise Institute, Charles Murray, has gone so far as to advocate for citizens, 
including businesses, to engage in “civil disobedience” by “ignor[ing] large portions of the laws 
and regulations with which we are burdened.” CHARLES MURRAY, BY THE PEOPLE: 
REBUILDING LIBERTY WITHOUT PERMISSION 129 (2015). He also suggests a private fund to 
provide legal assistance for those engaged in such disobedience and to raise public awareness and 
pressure politicians and regulators to change policies. Id. at 144–45. For a critique of Murray’s 
work, see Thomas O. McGarity, Corporate Crime Is Not ‘Civil Disobedience,’ ACS BLOG (May 
22, 2015), http://www.progressivereform.org/CPRBlog.cfm?idBlog=9F2FD56D-C8EA-BC01-
A131802EBC3EBE4B [https://perma.cc/H3NS-AS76] (“Murray’s idea is a gross perversion of 
the concept of civil disobedience as the nonviolent violation of a law that the violator deems to 
be unjust and the willingness to suffer the legal consequences to demonstrate the law’s injustice.”). 
 253. See PEÑALVER & KATYAL, supra note 105, at 146 (discussing concerns that property 
disobedience creates “uneven and potentially unfair effects” on third parties); WALZER, supra 
note 36, at 17 n.18 (discussing concerns that disobedience undermines the legal system). 
 254. Markovits, supra note 25, at 1902. 
 255. Id. at 1898. 
 256. Williams, supra note 82, at 1341–42. 
 257. RAWLS, supra note 238, at 321. 
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the equivalent of the human actors with conscience that organize, 
manage, work for, or own a share in them.258 This problematizes 
assertions that business corporations are legitimate actors for claiming 
moral stances against the law.259 
For example, Professor Jill Fisch explains that a corporation 
“lacks an authoritative source of moral reasoning, leaving it little 
alternative but to rely on legal rules as limits on actions.”260 The 
corporation is a separate legal entity that “cannot readily adopt the 
moral perspective of its individual constituents.”261 Shareholders “do 
not have the legal authority to make operational decisions”; fiduciary 
duties constrain officers and directors from “impos[ing] their personal 
moral views on the corporation”; and, at any rate, “there is little reason 
to believe their ethical views mirror those of society.”262 Moreover, 
“various corporate stakeholders may have differing moral 
perspectives.”263 Professor James Nelson has similarly highlighted that 
“the norms that accompany various corporate roles either encourage 
or demand a detached form of affiliation,” such that individuals do not 
typically form moral connections with business corporations.264 
Even those who do not see the profit motive as disqualifying for 
asserting moral claims or mitigating culpability might still believe that 
it deserves some conceptual weight and that nonprofit corporations 
should get more benefit of the doubt. Corporate disobedience engaged 
in for profit may warrant particularly searching scrutiny of whether the 
activity produces harmful externalities or serves the values of a 
democratic society and the public interest. 
4. Public vs. private.  Although the line between public and private 
corporations has become increasingly blurred in recent years,265 this 
 
 258. See, e.g., Kent Greenfield, Corporate Ethics in a Devilish System, 3 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 
427, 427 (2008) (“[A]s artificial entities, corporations are not subject to the constraints of 
conscience and social norm that limit the behavior of natural persons.”). 
 259. For a discussion of limits based on organizational and associational standing, see 
Brandon L. Garrett, The Constitutional Standing of Corporations, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 95, 143–47 
(2014). 
 260. Jill E. Fisch, The “Bad Man” Goes to Washington: The Effect of Political Influence on 
Corporate Duty, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1593, 1594 (2006). 
 261. Id. at 1603. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Nelson, supra note 92, at 1609. 
 265. See generally Elisabeth de Fontenay, The Deregulation of Private Capital and the Decline 
of the Public Company, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 445 (2017) (discussing the public-private divide); 
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distinction is potentially relevant in evaluating corporate disobedience 
for a few reasons. Publicness may indicate that a corporation’s activity 
is particularly unlikely to represent the social or political goals or other 
ideals of its shareholders or any identifiable persons associating for any 
purpose besides personal profit.266 Thus, public corporations’ claims of 
morality or conscience may be particularly deserving of skepticism and 
scrutiny. These corporations are not associational in terms of fitting a 
paradigm of a voluntary association or community in which individuals 
feel a sense of connection.267 This is not to say that private corporations 
do represent such associational or expressive associations, rather only 
that public corporations most certainly do not. 
Public corporations represent significant economic power and are 
typically subject to more oversight because of additional regulations 
and disclosures. They may be more likely to face consequences for 
illegal activity and incur consequences of larger magnitude. This might, 
in some instances, indicate a stronger likelihood that disobedience 
would provide social benefit, as corporations may not otherwise be 
willing to take on the risks of disobedient activity—particularly if it is 
done in the open.268 Finally, the general public can play a useful role as 
an additional regulatory force, pushing back on socially harmful or 
repugnant activity, and whether this occurs and the type of response 
can convey relevant information about the nature of the disobedience. 
To the extent that corporations operate in a public sphere, the 
possibility exists that employees, the media, politicians, and everyday 
people can meaningfully weigh in and have an incentive to do so.269 
In sum, as government officials and regulators around the world 
respond to corporate disobedience in dynamic contexts, several 
characteristics may be useful in helping to guide preliminary thinking 
 
Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, “Publicness” in Contemporary Securities 
Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 GEO. L.J. 337 (2013) (same). 
 266. See Blair & Pollman, supra note 26, at 1733 (discussing how public corporations “cannot 
be regarded as representing any particular natural person or group of natural persons” and have 
“organizational dynamics that cannot easily be tied to identifiable groups of people”). 
 267. Elizabeth Pollman, Constitutionalizing Corporate Law, 69 VAND. L. REV. 639, 672–73 
(2016). 
 268. Recall the Google general counsel’s statement, discussed above, that the company’s rule 
of thumb has been that if its products create value for people and society, then courts will usually 
come out on its side. See Driscoll, supra note 130. 
 269. The public sphere is arguably broader than the definition provided by securities laws. See 
Hillary A. Sale, The New “Public” Corporation, 74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 137, 137–38 (2011) 
(arguing that defining “public corporations as those that are traded in markets” is “impoverished” 
and that “the government and the media have increasing influence over public corporations and 
their governance”). 
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about the nature of disobedience, its potential value, and how or when 
it may merit response. These characteristics include whether a 
corporation is proactively seeking clarification or change in the law or 
is simply responding to enforcement action, whether its conduct is 
carried out in the open or in secret, whether the corporation is for-
profit or nonprofit, and whether it is public or private. These 
characteristics are not exclusive, nor do they specify a particular result 
or relieve any actor of liability. They instead reflect the beginning of a 
conceptual framework that could help guide more nuanced evaluation 
and understanding of the wide range of unlawful corporate activity. 
CONCLUSION 
Corporate disobedience paradoxically undermines the integrity of 
the legal system while at the same time plays an important role in 
shaping it. This Article seeks to bring attention to the broad spectrum 
of corporate disobedience, including instances in which corporations 
challenge, break, or subvert the law in connection with innovation and 
entrepreneurship, battles of federalism, moral stances, and general 
business lobbying. 
Observing this range of disobedient activity helps illuminate 
several aspects of corporate law that have long been the subject of 
debate. Despite the apparent possibility of constraining corporate 
lawbreaking through corporate law itself, the historic and existing 
mechanisms that have attempted this feat have largely failed. The 
above discussion highlights that while society’s interest in obedience to 
the law is embedded in corporate statutes, the right to enforce this 
dictate is held by shareholders who may not be well situated to monitor 
this activity and have a conflicting interest in maximizing the 
profitability and financial performance of the corporations in which 
they are invested. 
There is no easy way within corporate law to remedy this 
structural weakness because all corporate participants that are 
associated with the internal governance of the corporation by 
definition have a stake in the corporation and are not well positioned 
to represent the public interest at large. Exhortations that shareholders 
are also citizens—and that corporations should observe social and 
moral norms of legal obedience—do little to make such aims a reality. 
Furthermore, fiduciary duty doctrine itself has not dealt with concerns 
about the fairness and logical coherence of construing intentional 
violations of law as automatic breaches of the fiduciary duty of loyalty 
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without exception. Shareholders who stand to profit from corporate 
lawbreaking can also call on corporate directors and officers to pay 
when disobedience turns out not to benefit the corporation. 
Moreover, the relationship between business and law is dynamic, 
not static. The underlying laws at issue are external to corporate law. 
As the stories of Part II illustrate, there will always be companies that 
push the regulatory envelope or even operate in violation of law. From 
the Bank of the United States in Alexander Hamilton’s time to today’s 
“legalized” marijuana businesses, the complex framework of laws in 
our federalist system gives rise to opportunities for strategic advantage, 
claims of moral conscience, and unresolved tensions in the law. These 
various acts of corporate disobedience can cause great social harm and 
can spur valuable clarifications and changes to the law and other social 
good. Understanding the dynamism of the corporate disobedience 
spectrum provides rich areas for future work on how to respond to 
corporate challenges to the status quo that involve disobedience and 
whether there are more and less legitimate ways of changing and 
innovating around the law. 
 
